Severity: moderate 

Affected versions:

- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-azure-storage-datalake) 4.0.0 before 
4.14.9
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-azure-storage-datalake) 4.15.0 before 
4.18.4
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-azure-storage-datalake) 4.19.0 before 
4.22.0

Description:

Relative path traversal vulnerability in Apache Camel Azure-Storage Datalake 
component



This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.9, from 4.15.0 before 
4.18.4, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.0.



The camel-azure-storage-datalake component can download an Azure Data Lake 
Storage Gen2 file to the local filesystem through its downloadToFile operation, 
writing into the directory named by the fileDir endpoint option. 
DataLakeFileOperations.downloadToFile built the local target by joining fileDir 
with the remote path name exactly as the Azure SDK reported it (new 
File(fileDir, fileClientWrapper.getFileName())) and passed the result straight 
to the SDK download call, with no lexical normalization and no check that the 
resolved location stayed inside fileDir. The remote name is not 
route-controlled data: the consumer enumerates the filesystem in 
DataLakeConsumer.createBatchExchangesFromPath, which lists paths and creates 
one exchange per entry from PathItem.getName() verbatim, applying no name 
filtering by default. A path name containing parent-directory segments 
therefore resolved to a location outside the configured fileDir, letting anyone 
able to influence the names present in the consumed Data Lake filesystem cause 
Camel to create or overwrite a file at a location of their choosing, with the 
privileges of the Camel process. Depending on what the process can write to, 
overwriting a file outside the download directory can escalate beyond the loss 
of integrity of that file. The fileDir option is an ordinary common-group 
configuration parameter and carries no security marker, so nothing signalled to 
users that its value was not being enforced as a containment boundary. Camel's 
other file-download consumers - camel-file, camel-ftp, camel-smb, 
camel-mina-sftp and camel-azure-files - already constrained their local 
downloads to the configured directory using a path-segment boundary check; the 
camel-azure-storage-datalake download path was not covered by that work.



Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.22.0, which fixes the issue. If 
users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade 
to 4.14.9. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested 
to upgrade to 4.18.4. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, 
constrain the names the consumer will act on using the regex endpoint option, 
which is applied to each listed path name as a full-string match, so that only 
simple single-segment names are accepted and any name carrying a path separator 
or a parent-directory segment is filtered out before an exchange is created. 
Alternatively, avoid the downloadToFile operation on untrusted filesystems and 
write the payload from the route under a file name the route itself controls, 
rather than one taken from the remote listing. As defence in depth, treat the 
object names in any externally writable Data Lake filesystem as untrusted input 
and do not derive local filesystem paths from them.

Credit:

Hiep Nguyen (finder)
n0mi1k (finder)
Andrea Cosentino (remediation developer)

References:

https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-60093.html
https://camel.apache.org/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-60093

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