Fwd: [jetty-discuss] Microsoft IE7 compromise of session security

[Pier Fumagalli]

I found this on the Jetty list, and thought it was relevant as in the examples we tend to encode the continuation ID into the URL...

This is f***ing scary!!!

    Pier

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Chris Haynes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: 28 September 2005 13:04:53 BDT
To: "Jetty Discuss" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [jetty-discuss] Microsoft IE7 compromise of session security
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]




http://blogs.msdn.com/ie/archive/2005/09/09/463204.aspx















Chris Haynes




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List-Id: Discussion for Jetty development. <jetty- discuss.lists.sourceforge.net> Everyone concerned with data security and privacy should read the Microsoft developer Blog describing their IE7 anti-phishing feature: With this browser feature enabled, Microsoft sends a copy of the URL + path of every accessed page back to their HQ - even if you have HTTPS/SSL/TLS enabled! Note the posts I have added to the blog on and since 26 Sept, and the Microsoft response confirming the compromise of HTTPS. It is possible that beta browsers with this feature are already available in the wild. There is one particular aspect that Servlet developers / security managers should be aware of... If using URL-rewriting for session management, Microsoft will be sent a copy of the Session ID while that session is still open (whether or not TLS is involved) , as this sessionID is contained within the path. There is nothing technical preventing, say, a Microsoft employee or contractor from joining that session. Jetty might need to add a site-selectable option which detects the IE7 agent and throws an Exception if URL-rewriting is invoked - to prevent session IDs being sent to a compromised browser. Views, anyone? The other security / privacy concerns with this feature are of a broader nature, and probably OT for this list. Power Architecture Resource Center: Free content, downloads, discussions,

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