Or remove it altogether and let the evolution of that code be maintained by those interested in the narrative it provides? :)
On Wednesday, July 9, 2014, Andrew Grieve <agri...@chromium.org> wrote: > Sounds like we both agree that it doesn't work and adds a false sense of > security (to those that do opt into it) :P. > > Maybe what we should do is redesign the whitelist to do something more > useful. > > e.g. A whitelist that says what URLs you can navigate to is useful and easy > to implement. Let's just drop the trying to stop network requests aspect of > it? > > > On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 12:54 PM, Joe Bowser <bows...@gmail.com > <javascript:;>> wrote: > > > I'm in agreement with Andrew on this one. If we can get CSP working, > > that's a far better solution than our Whitelist, which was done > > because it was needed at the time for the enterprise use case that IBM > > had. I don't think we're ever going to stop are users from doing dumb > > things like including thirdpartyadnetworkthatdoesnoteusehttps.js in > > their apps any time soon, but they'll have to jump through more hoops > > to do dumb things, and making dumb things harder is a good thing. > > > > On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 9:47 AM, Brian LeRoux <b...@brian.io <javascript:;>> > wrote: > > > Heh. Why do we always seem to be at the opposite end of considerations? > > > (Not a bad thing anyhow. ;) > > > > > > So making whitelist a plugin would most certainly isolate the code > which > > > would help us better understand: > > > > > > 1.) where the surface for bugs are (we seem to miss/find new security > > holes > > > each quarter…) > > > 2.) if people actually use it > > > > > > I'm more interested in #2. I suspect the only people whom do use it are > > > security researchers disproving the whitelist veracity. I feel this API > > was > > > a mistake, is misleading, and ultimately leads to poor web security > > > practices wrt 3rd part scripts. I'd like the evidence to remove it > > > completely and making it a plugin would do that. (And still allow for > its > > > existence to those whom want to contribute to a "marketing" based api.) > > > > > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 6:52 AM, Andrew Grieve <agri...@chromium.org > <javascript:;>> > > wrote: > > > > > >> I don't think moving the whitelist to a plugin would aid in its > > >> understanding. Right now the whitelist is used for two things: > > >> > > >> 1. Whether to allow network requests through (although this is broken > > for > > >> <audio>/<video> on iOS, and broken for them + websockets on Android > > >> 2. Whether to allow top frame navigations (e.g. clicking a link to > > http:// > > >> * > > >> opens in system browser vs. webview) > > >> > > >> #1 doesn't work very well due to technical limitations. > > >> #2 is actually the more import one security-wise I think, and I don't > > think > > >> should be relegated to a plugin. > > >> > > >> I'm hoping medium-term that CSP can replace the use-case of #1. > > >> > > >> > > >> On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 10:21 PM, Ian Clelland <iclell...@chromium.org > <javascript:;>> > > >> wrote: > > >> > > >> > What would be the security implication of removing it from core? No > > >> access > > >> > at all by default? Or unlimited access by default? > > >> > > > >> > I suspect that if the default policy with no plugin installed is the > > >> > latter, then we will be given the impression that it's not important > > at > > >> all > > >> > :) > > >> > > > >> > I had considered just turning the whitelist settings into a plugin > -- > > >> > either leaving the default rules as they are, and writing a > > >> > "cordova-security" plugin that locks it down, or tighten everything > by > > >> > default, and tell people to install "cordova-plugin-insecurity" if > > they > > >> > want to open it up :) > > >> > > > >> > I like the idea of making the entire whitelist architecture into a > > >> plugin, > > >> > though. If nothing else, it should be easier to reason about it, and > > >> easier > > >> > to fix or replace it in the future if we need to. > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 3:55 PM, Shazron <shaz...@gmail.com > <javascript:;>> wrote: > > >> > > > >> > > Actually it's already possible in any iOS version, we just have to > > >> > > make sure the plugin loads at startup. This is for UIWebView only, > > >> > > WKWebView has this issue: > > >> > > https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CB-7049 - you can't > intercept > > >> > > any requests from it currently (not sure if anything changed in > iOS > > 8 > > >> > > beta 3) > > >> > > > > >> > > On Mon, Jul 7, 2014 at 11:45 AM, Brian LeRoux <b...@brian.io > <javascript:;>> wrote: > > >> > > > Was discussing this w/ Shaz and Joe and, in theory, this is > > possible > > >> > from > > >> > > > iOS8 onward and possibly w/ some refactoring in the 4.x series > of > > >> > > Android. > > >> > > > > > >> > > > Its also probably the single most problematic areas of > > >> misunderstanding > > >> > > as > > >> > > > it relates to security we have. Isolating it from core would > give > > us > > >> a > > >> > > > better picture of how important it truly is. > > >> > > > > > >> > > > Thoughts? > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > >
