Sounds advisable to me, this is how Edirectory handles admin password resets, btw.. Not just to prevent reuse of simple temp passwords, but also to prevent
a) telling admins real previous passwords that could still be in use elsewhere or b) giving hints on a user's password scheme which may enable the admin to guess current/future passwords. For that reason only a user himself must be able to see the "already in history" type of error on a password change. Admins should be able to set any password for other accounts, as long as it adhere's to the password complexity policy. Cheers, Lothar > Am 23.07.2015 um 18:47 schrieb Theisen, Lucas <[email protected]>: > > The password policy RFC > (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-behera-ldap-password-policy-10#section-8.2.6 > > <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-behera-ldap-password-policy-10#section-8.2.6>) > is not very explicit, but it seems to me that an admin user account should > be exempt from the pwdHistory check. Its not uncommon (though ill advised) > for admins to supply simple temporary passwords, and if history is long > enough, they may have already done so with the same password. This is > causing failures for me. I can get around it be manipulating the pwdHistory > beforehand, but that seems like it should be unnecessary. What do you think? > Should we enable admin to avoid this check?
