Hi Viola,

I haven't looked at the details in some time.... check anything I might say :-).
On Aug 10, 2011, at 1:47 AM, viola lu wrote:

> Hi, David:
> 
>   1. If container-managed security is implemented, but how to configure it 
> for connector?

I think at one time there was a unit test that had most of the setup in it.

> 
>   2. Now one customer doesn't want to use same db id but different user 
> credentials as below, container-managed security can meet this requirement?
> 
>   "Configure a geronimo Instance running in a windows domain with a db2 
> datasource, which connects to the iseries using kerberos.
> In order for this to work with any kind of success, we believe we need to 
> configure some kind of connection reauthentication.  If geronimo
> does not invoke connection reauthentication, then any connection pool would 
> quickly fill up with connections per individual user.
> Ultimately this would negate any benefit of connection pooling. connection 
> reauthentication would allow geronimo to assert the
> current callers identity onto the running connection."
> 
> "Our ultimate goal here is to configure End To End single signon from a 
> windows browser, through geronimo, and onto the System i.  Whereby    
> the clients identity is preserved throughout."
> 
>  3. Based on the above requirement, datasource connects to iseries using 
> kerberos, currently tranql-ra/ra.xml, set authentication-mechanism as 
> basicpassword, if datasource uses kerberos, should we change authentication 
> mechanism to Kerbv5 as below? 
> <authentication-mechanism>
>                 <description>Uses JDBC user/password authentication based on 
> properties supplied to connect</description>
>                 
> <authentication-mechanism-type>BasicPassword</authentication-mechanism-type>
>                 
> <credential-interface>javax.resource.spi.security.PasswordCredential</credential-interface>
>             </authentication-mechanism>
> 
> And <reauthentication-support>false</reauthentication-support> should change 
> to true support connection reauthentication. And in our geronimo-connector 
> should handle this connection reauthentication ? Also database pool in 
> console should support these configuration?
> 
> 4.From  
> http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/websphere/techjournal/0506_barghouthi/0506_barghouthi.html,
>  it provides a datastorehelper interface to end-users for db connection 
> reauthentication function, for example, db2
> end-user can implement its doConnectionPerTransation method by using db2 api: 
> resetDB2Connection, same way can be used in geronimo? I am not sure 
> connection-reauthentication is necessary or good way if different users 
> filled up connection pool.

There are 2 additional issues here:

1. using kerberos rather than user-password.  I think there's some support in 
the j2ca spec for this (GSSUP? GSS???), but not in the jdbc spec or tranql.  I 
think this would require understanding how this is supposed to work with a test 
system and modifying the tranql wrapper so it could deal with these credentials 
and send them to the db2 driver in the (non-jdbc-spec) expected way.

2. implementing reauthentication.  Again, the j2ca spec talks about this but 
the jdbc spec does not.  So we'd need to find out how db2 implements this and 
wrap that in an adapter between the j2ca reauthentication and the db2 driver, 
inside the tranql wrapper.

In addition, we may need more/better kerberos login modules in geronimo, and 
possibly a "mapping" login module to get from the original identity to the db 
identity.

As the customer says, without reauthentication the connections will pile up and 
the pool will get full of unused connections.

I've thought about implementing this in the past, but without a working system 
to test and an actual user it seemed impractical.  With a system to try it out 
on it might not be too hard.

I am not sure we should expend the effort to make this configurable in the 
admin console until we have more than one user who wants to use this feature :-)

thanks
david jencks

> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Aug 10, 2011 at 1:15 PM, David Jencks <[email protected]> wrote:
> Hi Viola,
> 
> The docs are correct and we implement everything it says we do.  However 
> except in unusual circumstances it doesn't make a lot of sense to use 
> container managed security.  I think perhaps you are getting confused by the 
> name.  In any of these scenarios, the ManagedConnectionFactory has to be 
> consulted about the credentials, and presumably it will consult the actual 
> resource manager (e.g. database server).  The "container managed" is about 
> where the credentials come from.
> 
> Usually with a database you want all the connections as the same user.  In 
> this case you might as well configure the user and password as mcf properties 
> and be done with it.  This is sort of "unmanaged non-application" security.
> 
> Application managed security means (for jdbc) that the application will call 
> ds.getConnection(user,pw).
> 
> Container managed security means that the container will take the users 
> identity (and possibly credentials) and somehow derive the credentials needed 
> by the mcf/database from it.  For instance you could use the users name and 
> pw to log into the db, or you could use some role they are in to derive the 
> user name/pw (e.g. each role gets a different database user), or you could 
> come up with some other scheme.  However, usually people don't want to do 
> this, they just want everyone to have the same db id, so it doesn't make a 
> lot of sense to set up a mapping that maps everyone to the same credentials.
> 
> Is this clearer?
> 
> I implemented the inbound security stuff so we should consider updating the 
> docs for 3.0.  Perhaps the excerpt below can be made clearer so people other 
> than me can understand it :-\
> 
> thanks
> david jencks
> 
> On Aug 9, 2011, at 9:47 PM, viola lu wrote:
> 
>> Hi, Dev:
>> 
>>  From geronimo 2.1 doc: 
>> https://cwiki.apache.org/GMOxDOC21/connectors-and-transaction-management-jdbc-jms-j2ca-datasource-connection-pool-eis.html
>> Security (Credentials)
>> In the J2CA 1.5 spec security considerations are confined to providing the 
>> credentials for outbound connections. There is no provision for credential 
>> inflow for inbound messaging. This hole is being addressed in the next spec 
>> revision.
>> There are three possible sources for credentials for outbound connections:
>> 
>> ManagedConnectionFactory configuration. Most ManagedConnectionFactory 
>> implementations include user and password config-properties. In the absence 
>> of other credentials these are used to authenticate to the resource manager. 
>> The values of these properties are generally difficult to conceal securely 
>> as they are in some geronimo configuration files on disk and need to be 
>> accessible to geronimo in order to create connections. However, this is by 
>> far the most frequently used option. This will result in all work in your 
>> e.g. database being done by the same user, which basically represents the 
>> identity of the geronimo server.
>> Application managed security. Many connection factories such as DataSource 
>> provide a way to request connections with a particular security context, 
>> such as dataSource.getConnection(user, password). This requires your app to 
>> have detailed knowledge of the credentials needed which is rarely 
>> appropriate.
>> Container managed security. With this scheme you deploy a LoginModule 
>> specific to the connector you are using that installs suitable credentials 
>> into the Subject on login. When a connection is requested these credentials 
>> are extracted from the Subject and used in obtaining the connection. A wide 
>> variety of schemes can be used here including
>> Fixed credentials. Every subject gets the same credentials. This has the 
>> same effect as the default credentials scheme except that the credentials 
>> may be stored in an external more secure location more easily.
>> User credentials. The credentials are the user and password of the user 
>> themselves. In this case the work will be done in the resource manager 
>> (database) as the user themselves. Unless the connector supports 
>> reauthentication (changing the user on an existing connection) this will 
>> prevent effective connection pooling.
>> Mapped credentials. The credentials for the resource manager are determined 
>> from the user identity. For instance the resource manager user could depend 
>> on the user being a member of a particular enterprise role or group. In this 
>> case without reauthentication support connection pooling should be set up so 
>> each resource manager user gets a separate pool.
>> 
>> Seems there is Container Managed Security function in security part of 
>> connector, i  checked the code, currently, we all use 
>> ManagedConnectionFactory to do security authentication. not 
>> container-managed security. So the feature of user credetials of container 
>> managed security. And if we plan to implement this function, any suggestion 
>> of tech details of geronimo-connector module change?
>> 
>> Appreciate your help!
>> -- 
>> viola
>> 
>> Apache Geronimo
>> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> viola
> 
> Apache Geronimo
> 

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