Am 17.10.2015 um 11:18 schrieb Kaspar Brand:
Another - quite radical - approach would consist of using a whitelist, which consists of a single cipher suite only: given that section 9.2 of RFC 7540 states "Implementations of HTTP/2 MUST use TLS version 1.2" and section 9.2.2 further says "deployments of HTTP/2 that use TLS 1.2 MUST support TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 [TLS-ECDHE] with the P-256 elliptic curve [FIPS186]" then "H2Compliance on" would only have to make sure that this exact suite is negotiated. (What this MTI cipher suite also means, IINM, is that you can't run an RFC 7540 h2 compliant server with an ECDSA key only, actually... not sure if that was really an intended effect of this requirement.)
terrible idea because it would lead to disable new, safer and recommended ciphers in the future until somebody adds them to the whitelist
so users (clientside) would have to wait for openssl *and* apache after their browser has already support and with the current release cycles of all major browsers it's likely to end that way
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