bitflicker64 opened a new issue, #3188:
URL: https://github.com/apache/hugegraph/issues/3188
### Bug Type (问题类型)
logic (逻辑设计问题)
### Before submit
- [x] I have confirmed and searched that there are no similar problems in
the historical issues and documents
### Environment (环境信息)
- Server Version: 1.7.0 (released) and master at 98477f0f; the two files
involved are byte-identical in behaviour on both, master only adds TODO
comments on top
- Backend: hstore, 3 PD x 3 Store x 3 Server on Kubernetes (Helm chart from
#3132); the behaviour is in PD and does not depend on the deployment
- OS: measured against `hugegraph/pd` at revision 98477f0f5 on a kind
cluster and against the same image standalone in Docker
- Data Size: n/a
### Expected & Actual behavior (期望与实际表现)
Two defects in PD's REST authentication interceptor. They fail in opposite
directions, so they are described separately, but they live in the same two
classes and should be fixed together.
**Expected.** A request to a PD management endpoint carries a Basic
credential; the interceptor verifies both the service name and its password; a
refused or missing credential gets a 401 so callers and monitors can tell.
**Actual, part 1: the password is never read.**
`hg-pd-service/.../service/interceptor/Authentication.java` decodes the Basic
credential, keeps only the part before the colon, and checks it against a fixed
set:
```java
private static final Set<String> innerModules = Set.of("hg", "store",
"hubble", "vermeer");
// TODO: password validation is skipped — only service name is checked
against
// innerModules. Full credential validation should be added as part of the
auth refactor.
//String pwd = info.substring(delim + 1);
if (innerModules.contains(name)) { return call.get(); }
throw new AccessDeniedException("invalid service name");
```
So any of the four names with any password, including an empty one, is
treated as an internal component. The names are in the source, so they are not
a secret.
**Actual, part 2: every outcome is HTTP 200.**
`RestAuthentication.preHandle` writes `{"error":"Unauthorized!","status":-1}`
for a missing header and the `AccessDeniedException` message for an unknown
name, but never calls `setStatus`. Success, refusal and no credential all
return 200 with the result in the body.
Measured on 2026-09-02, 27 requests, all returned HTTP 200:
| Credential | `/v1/members` | `/v1/stores` | `/v1/allInfo` |
|---|---|---|---|
| no header | `Unauthorized!` | `Unauthorized!` | `Unauthorized!` |
| `-u hg:` (empty password) | leader and member list | store list | full
registry |
| `-u hg:wrongpassword` | leader and member list | store list | full
registry |
| `-u store:` `-u hubble:` `-u vermeer:` | leader and member list | store
list | full registry |
| `-u admin:<real admin password>` | `invalid service name` | `invalid
service name` | `invalid service name` |
| `-u nobody:x` | `invalid service name` | `invalid service name` | `invalid
service name` |
The real admin password is refused because its name is not in the set, and
an empty password with the right name succeeds: the password is inert.

**Why it matters: the endpoints behind that check mutate the cluster.**
Everything under `/v1` except `/v1/health`, `/actuator/*`, `/v1/prom/targets/*`
(and `/v1/ready` once #3185 lands) sits behind the interceptor, and that
includes:
- `POST /v1/members/change`, which rewrites the raft peer list (master
carries a TODO on this handler saying any caller with network access can
trigger it)
- `DELETE /v1/store/{storeId}`, which removes a Store
- `POST /v1/store/{storeId}`, which sets a Store's state
- `POST /v1/graph/**` and `POST /v1/graph-spaces/**`, which write graph and
graphspace configuration
- `GET /v1/task/patrolPartitions`, `balanceLeaders`, `balancePartitions`,
which trigger data movement
The 1.7.0 PD README gives `docker run ... -p 8620:8620` and says to open
port 8620 for REST, with no note about authentication, so a deployment that
follows the released docs exposes these to anyone who can reach the port with a
four-letter username.
**Why part 2 matters on its own.** Nothing keyed on a status code can see a
refusal: monitors do not fire, `curl -f` never fails (the shipped compose
healthchecks use exactly that), and a refused or bypassed request leaves no 401
anywhere. It also bites documentation: the Helm chart's recovery commands
originally ran without a credential, printed 200 three times and did nothing,
which is how this was found.
### Proposal: fix both in 1.8.0, as one bundle
1. In `Authentication.authenticate`, read the password and compare it with
the token stored for that service name (the `PD/TOKEN/<name>` path already
exists), refusing on mismatch.
2. In `RestAuthentication.preHandle`, call `response.setStatus(401)` before
writing the error body, for both the missing-header and the refused case.
3. Wire the token into every client that currently gets in on the name
alone: the Server's PD registration, the Store, Hubble
(`operations.pd.password` is empty in the shipped configuration) and the
compose files. The Helm chart will add a Secret and env wiring on its side
(#3132).
4. Document the tokens on every page that names port 8620, and until then
add a note to the PD README and the site docs that 8620 must not be exposed off
a trusted network.
Probes do not need to change: #3185 adds `/v1/ready` to the unauthenticated
list for exactly that reason.
**Why 1.8.0 is the right boundary rather than a patch release.** Checking
passwords breaks every current client at once, so this cannot ship as 1.7.x; it
has to land with the client wiring in the same release. 1.8.0 is already that
release: about 100 commits since 1.7.0, including the compose topology rebuilt
twice (#2952, #3149), shipped config defaults changed in seven files, outdated
backends removed (#3116), the legacy scheduler disabled (#3082), the Server
REST API adapted (#3159) and two proto files changed. An operator upgrading has
to redo their deployment anyway, and the docs for those pages are being
rewritten now. The 1.7.0 install base is small (289 tarball downloads in ten
months), so the population that has to set a token is bounded, and it is the
same population that is already re-reading its configuration for 1.8.0. Waiting
for 1.9.0 means one more release in which a documented deployment exposes a
mutating management API behind a public username.
### Related
- #3183 and #3185: the readiness endpoint work; #3185 keeps probes off the
authenticated surface, which is what lets this fix leave probes alone.
- #3132: the Helm chart, which currently documents this in Limitations and
writes its recovery commands as `curl -u hg: ...` because that is what works
today.
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