Everett, yeah no problem :) Actually I tried to edit that wiki page some time ago but I couldn't find my way, then I forgot to ask for help.
Could you help me? Best, Andrea On Fri, Oct 17, 2014 at 4:26 PM, Everett Toews <everett.to...@rackspace.com> wrote: > Hi Andrea, > > Would you be willing to add yourself as the steward for Softlayer and Docker > on our Stewards [1] page? > > I don’t mean to put you on the spot but I wanted to throw it out there. > > Regards, > Everett > > [1] https://wiki.apache.org/jclouds/Stewards > > > On Oct 17, 2014, at 5:19 AM, Andrea Turli <andrea.tu...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> +1 (binding) >> >> * Executed the validation script: >> - Source code compiles and passes all tests >> - There are no RAT violations >> - Checksums match >> - Signatures match >> * All LICENSE and NOTICE files are correct >> >> * I ran also LiveTests for Docker and SoftLayer: >> - SoftLayer: >> Tests run: 154, Failures: 15, Errors: 0, Skipped: 10 >> - Docker (still on 1.0 version): >> Tests run: 38, Failures: 2, Errors: 0, Skipped: 26 >> >> For Docker *LiveTests: the provider needs a version bump, Docker >> continues to push new version out continuously, so the next release >> will have a best LiveTest coverage and will support latest Docker >> Engine. >> >> Cheers, >> Andrea >> >> On Fri, Oct 17, 2014 at 7:15 AM, Niraj Tolia <nto...@maginatics.com> wrote: >>> On Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 10:04 PM, Chris Custine <chris.cust...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> On October 16, 2014 at 10:49:33 PM, Niraj Tolia >>>> (nto...@maginatics.com(mailto:nto...@maginatics.com)) wrote: >>>>> On Thu, Oct 16, 2014 at 9:43 PM, Chris Custine wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I am hoping others can confirm this, but after reading the advisory and >>>>>> several commentaries on it, I can’t think of any way that this exploit >>>>>> can affect a jclouds client. My interpretation is that in addition to >>>>>> the man in the middle requirement to force the protocol downgrade to >>>>>> SSL3 and subsequent packet modification, the exploit also requires some >>>>>> injection of code onto the client that will cause the client to execute >>>>>> repeated requests to an endpoint with an incrementing http path length >>>>>> and decrementing body length. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> No, anyone on the network path in between the client and server can >>>>> initiate this attack. https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/ssl-poodle.pdf and >>>>> https://www.dfranke.us/posts/2014-10-14-how-poodle-happened.html has a >>>>> lot more context on this but the interesting quote is: >>>> >>>> This is the part that enables the exploit of SSL3, but this is not the >>>> actual exploit. >>>> >>>>> >>>>> So if an attacker that controls the network between the client and the >>>>> server interferes with any attempted handshake offering TLS 1.0 or >>>>> later, such clients will readily confine themselves to SSL 3.0. >>>> >>>> I understand that part, but this is just initiating the protocol >>>> downgrade. Downgrading to SSL3 isn’t really the issue, the issue is what >>>> is done to exploit that. They would still need to initiate many >>>> specifically formatted requests with varying path and body lengths from >>>> the *real* client to eventually resolve the encrypted attributes (from a >>>> jclouds standpoint this would probably be auth headers). This means that >>>> some part of the response from the actual endpoint would have to have some >>>> content that causes jclouds itself to go rogue and start making these >>>> orchestrated requests to nonsense urls, and with body content that is >>>> decremented to match the incrementing path, and do this many times (up to >>>> 256 times for each byte) until the server does not reject the SSL. If we >>>> have an flaw that allows execution of arbitrary script code of some >>>> variety in jclouds, then I am suddenly worried about a lot more than this >>>> exploit. :-) >>>> >>> >>> >>> Ah, I see better what you mean. Yes, from my understanding of POODLE, >>> there has to be some way for the attacker to be able to get jclouds to >>> generate URLs in the above scenario. We do not know all the ways in >>> which jclouds users use the library and if users can control the URLs >>> (say, for example, using a filename for upload that gets directly >>> encoded into the filename), I wonder if that is sufficient to launch >>> the attack. >>> >>> Cheers, >>> Niraj >>> >>> >>>> My 2 cents. >>>> >>>> Chris >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Cheers, >>>>> Niraj >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I don’t see any opportunities to inject random script code into a >>>>>> jclouds client and have it execute in a way similar to javascript in a >>>>>> browser, and from what I have read, that is what it would take to make >>>>>> use of this exploit. >>>>>> >>>>>> Hopefully other will have the opportunity to interpret this and weigh in >>>>>> with their insight as well. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks, >>>>>> Chris >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Chris Custine >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On October 16, 2014 at 6:20:23 PM, Andrew Phillips >>>>>> (aphill...@qrmedia.com(mailto:aphill...@qrmedia.com)) wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>>> I prefer to exercise an abundance of caution and extend the vote until >>>>>>>> we understand the issue. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I wasn't planning to close the vote until we have more details on >>>>>>> this, indeed. Obviously, the more people can help have a look at this, >>>>>>> the better ;-) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> PR at https://github.com/jclouds/jclouds/pull/575 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ap >>>>>> >>>> >
