On 19/07/2018 11:03, Philippe Mouawad wrote:
On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 11:56 AM, sebb <seb...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 19 July 2018 at 10:34, Philippe Mouawad <philippe.moua...@gmail.com>
wrote:
On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 11:31 AM, sebb <seb...@gmail.com> wrote:
On 19 July 2018 at 10:28, Philippe Mouawad <philippe.moua...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Hello sebb,
Yes users can change, but once again, it means adjusting defaults,
knowing
they can be adjusted and which property it is.
That can be documented.
Which means all users read the whole documentation, do you think they do
?
I guess you know the famous RTFM :-)
Why not make defaults better for usability ?
Because it compromises security.
Can you give more details ?
The point of a CA is to certify that a certificate chain is valid.
Locally generated CA certs do not do this.
Once the cert has been approved by the browser, it can be used to
certify anything, including a spoof bank site etc.
JMeter users may not understand that, and so may not take sufficient
care of the certificate and its password.
Or they may forget that the cert has been added to the browser.
Even some official CAs have inadvertently exposed their certs.
I don't think we should ship JMeter with deliberately weak settings.
Yes it may be inconvenient, but it is deliberately done to minimise
the effects of accidental certificate exposure.
Users that understand the risks can override the setting, but that is
at their own risk.
Remember that once the browser has stored the CA, it will be active
regardless of whether JMeter is actually being used.
So the sooner it expires, the safer it is.
Maybe a week is too *long*.
I am aware of that, but it means attacker has accessed the machine of user
to get the CA.
So the JMeter side is only a consequence, not root cause
The risk is the same if the duration is 7 days or 3 months, because the
attacker need to have access to the private key of the temp JMeter CA
root to generate some fake cert signed by the CA. This private key is on
the machine (keystore.jks)
And if an attacker have already an access to the machine, it's can add
directly another CA (not JMeter CA) into the certs vault on the machine,
to made some malicious opérations...
3 months seems good for me (this is the mean duration for my load test
missions)
It looks like 3 months would be good for Bruno, Antonio, me.
Is it really a blocker for you ? if yes why ?
As above.
@Others what's your opinion ?
Thanks
On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 10:55 AM, sebb <seb...@gmail.com> wrote:
It's a trade-off between convenience and security.
It's risky adding the certificate to the browser.
I don't think the default should be changed.
Users can always change it themselves if they accept the risks.
E.g. if they use a separate browser installation that has
certificate,
then a longer validity is more sensible.
It's too easy to forget that the cert has been added to the browser.
S.
On 19 July 2018 at 09:35, Antonio Gomes Rodrigues <ra0...@gmail.com>
wrote:
+1 for me
Le jeu. 19 juil. 2018 à 10:27, Philippe Mouawad <
p.moua...@ubik-ingenierie.com> a écrit :
Hello,
Currently :
- proxy.cert.validity=7
This is annoying for users who must remember to add the ROOT
JMeter
certificate to browser every week .
I would suggest setting it to 1 year or at least 1 month.
Regards
Philippe
--
Cordialement.
Philippe Mouawad.
--
Cordialement.
Philippe Mouawad.
