Hi Manikumar and Kirk,
Thanks for all the reviews.

I intend to move the KIP to the voting phase next week.

Thanks,
Prabhash

On Fri, Feb 13, 2026 at 11:02 AM Kirk True <[email protected]> wrote:

> Hi Prabhash,
>
> On Wed, Feb 11, 2026, at 12:18 AM, Prabhash Kumar wrote:
> > >
> > > 1. If I understand correctly, the original change proposed in
> KAFKA-18608
> > > would be supported by Example 4 in this KIP.
> > > 2. PR https://github.com/apache/kafka/pull/21156
> > > <
> > >
> https://github.com/apache/kafka/pull/21156%5D(https://github.com/apache/kafka/pull/21156)
> > > >
> > > added
> > > support for `sasl.oauthbearer.assertion.claim.kid`.
> > >     Should this configuration/change also be included as part of this
> KIP?
> >
> > The PR introduces a new sasl.oauthbearer.assertion.claim.kid
> configuration,
> > but this is unnecessary because KIP-1139 already provides
> sasl.oauthbearer
> > .assertion.template.file which can specify the kid in the JWT header:
> > ```
> > {
> >   "header": {
> >     "kid": "my-key-identifier",
> >     "alg": "RS256",
> >     "typ": "JWT"
> >   },
> >   "payload": {
> >     "iss": "my-client",
> >     "sub": "my-service-account"
> >   }
> > }
> > ```
> > Ref:
> >
> https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/KAFKA/KIP-1139%3A+Add+support+for+OAuth+jwt-bearer+grant+type#KIP1139:AddsupportforOAuthjwtbearergranttype-FileReloading:~:text=will%20be%20ignored.-,sasl.oauthbearer.assertion.template.file,-String
> >
> > Kirk can maybe vouch for this.
>
> Yes, KIP-1139 favored the template approach to avoid having to multiple,
> optional configuration for individual headers and claims.
>
> >
> > The KIP seems focused entirely on the client side. Does the broker
> > > require any changes to accept clients using assertions?
> >
> > Broker never sees an assertion, it always sees an access token
> >
> >    - Broker receives SASL/OAUTHBEARER with access token (same as before)
> >
> >
> >    - Broker validates token using existing validation logic (same as
> before)
> >
> >
> >    - Token format and validation are identical
> >
> >
> > Why are the supported algorithms limited to RS256 and ES256? Is there a
> > > plan to support additional algorithms?
> > >
> >
> >    - These are inherited from KIP-1139's assertion infrastructure
> >    - These two algorithms cover the vast majority of real-world OAuth
> deploy
> >    ments.
> >    - Maybe, adding other algorithms can be taken up as future work?
>
> I think that was a compromise we made for KIP-1139 was to add only the
> more common algorithms. Additional algorithms can be included, although
> they would necessitate a KIP.
>
> > What happens if both `assertion.file` and `assertion.claim.iss` are set?
> > > Is this considered an error, or does `assertion.file` take precedence?
> > >
> > It won't be an error `assertion.file` will take precedence.
>
> Yes, that's from KIP-1139.
>
> Thanks,
> Kirk
>
> >
> > 6. Please ensure there are clear logs, error messages, and tests
> explaining
> > > the three-tier fallback mechanism to make debugging easier.
> > > 7. Please include comprehensive documentation as part of the
> > > implementation.
> >
> > Noted.
> >
> > On Mon, Feb 9, 2026 at 2:13 PM Manikumar <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > Thanks for the KIP! I have a few comments below.
> > >
> > > 1. If I understand correctly, the original change proposed in
> KAFKA-18608
> > > would be supported by Example 4 in this KIP.
> > > 2. PR https://github.com/apache/kafka/pull/21156
> > > <
> > >
> https://github.com/apache/kafka/pull/21156%5D(https://github.com/apache/kafka/pull/21156)
> > > >
> > > added
> > > support for `sasl.oauthbearer.assertion.claim.kid`.
> > >     Should this configuration/change also be included as part of this
> KIP?
> > > 3. The KIP seems focused entirely on the client side. Does the broker
> > > require any changes to accept clients using assertions?
> > > 4. Why are the supported algorithms limited to RS256 and ES256? Is
> there a
> > > plan to support additional algorithms?
> > > 5. What happens if both `assertion.file` and `assertion.claim.iss` are
> set?
> > > Is this considered an error, or does `assertion.file` take precedence?
> > >
> > > General implementation notes:
> > >
> > > 6. Please ensure there are clear logs, error messages, and tests
> explaining
> > > the three-tier fallback mechanism to make debugging easier.
> > > 7. Please include comprehensive documentation as part of the
> > > implementation.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Manikumar
> > >
> > > On Tue, Feb 3, 2026 at 2:27 PM Prabhash Kumar <
> [email protected]>
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Hi Kirk,
> > > > Thanks for the feedback.
> > > >
> > > > Minor suggestion: grouping the five left-most UML "actors" together
> would
> > > > > more clearly indicate that those actions happen on the client vs.
> the
> > > IdP
> > > > > and broker
> > > >
> > > > Updated. Thanks!
> > > >
> > > > Does the logic in KIP-1258 also support the older mechanism for
> > > specifying
> > > > > OAuth settings in sasl.jaas.config?
> > > >
> > > > Yes, KIP-1258 maintains full backward compatibility with the pre-4.1
> > > > JAAS-based
> > > > configuration. The HttpRequestFormatterFactory uses the existing
> > > > ConfigOrJaas utility class (introduced in the original OAuth
> > > > implementation)
> > > > which checks for configurations in this order:
> > > >
> > > >    1. Top-level configuration (e.g.,
> sasl.oauthbearer.client.credentials.
> > > >    client.id)
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >    2. JAAS options (e.g., clientId in sasl.jaas.config)
> > > >
> > > > This means both old and new configuration styles work seamlessly.
> > > >
> > > > Thanks for adding integration tests for re-authentication to the test
> > > plan
> > > > > as this is an area that needs more coverage.
> > > >
> > > > Will surely try to include this in testing. Thanks!
> > > >
> > > >  The existing JwtBearerJwtRetriever class has logic similar to the
> > > > > multi-tier fallback mechanism described in the KIP. Is the
> intention to
> > > > > retrofit existing code to use the fallback, where appropriate?
> > > >
> > > > JwtBearerJwtRetriever (KIP-1139):
> > > >
> > > >    - Directly creates JwtBearerRequestFormatter
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >    - No fallback mechanism
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >    - Always uses assertions (by design - jwt-bearer grant type IS an
> > > >     assertion)
> > > >
> > > > I don't think JwtBearerJwtRetriever should use the fallback mechanism
> > > >  because:
> > > >
> > > >    1. The jwt-bearer grant type is assertion-only by definition
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >    2. Adding a client secret fallback would be semantically
> incorrect for
> > > > this
> > > >    grant type
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > Thanks,
> > > > Prabhash
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Jan 14, 2026 at 6:49 AM Kirk True <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Hi Prabhash,
> > > > >
> > > > > Thanks for the KIP! It's very comprehensive and lays it out well.
> > > > >
> > > > > My feedback is very minor:
> > > > >
> > > > >  1. Minor suggestion: grouping the five left-most UML "actors"
> together
> > > > > would more clearly indicate that those actions happen on the
> client vs.
> > > > the
> > > > > IdP and broker
> > > > >  2. Until 4.1, the "client_id" configuration was embedded as an
> option
> > > > > under sasl.jaas.config. In 4.1 it (along with scope and other
> options)
> > > > were
> > > > > "promoted" to top level configuration as seen in this KIP. Does the
> > > logic
> > > > > in KIP-1258 also support the older mechanism for specifying OAuth
> > > > settings
> > > > > in sasl.jaas.config?
> > > > >  3. Thanks for adding integration tests for re-authentication to
> the
> > > test
> > > > > plan as this is an area that needs more coverage.
> > > > >  4. The existing JwtBearerJwtRetriever class has logic similar to
> the
> > > > > multi-tier fallback mechanism described in the KIP. Is the
> intention to
> > > > > retrofit existing code to use the fallback, where appropriate?
> > > > >
> > > > > Thanks,
> > > > > Kirk
> > > > >
> > > > > On Mon, Dec 22, 2025, at 4:59 AM, Prabhash Kumar wrote:
> > > > > > Hi everyone,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I'd like to start a discussion on* KIP-1258: Add Support for
> OAuth
> > > > Client
> > > > > > Assertion to client_credentials Grant Type*
> > > > > >
> > > > > > *Problem:*
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Apache Kafka added support for the OAuth 2.0 client_credentials
> grant
> > > > > type
> > > > > > in KIP-768. The current implementation uses the traditional
> client
> > > > > > authentication method where a client authenticates using a
> client ID
> > > > and
> > > > > > client secret passed via HTTP Basic authentication. While
> functional,
> > > > > this
> > > > > > approach has several limitations in modern cloud-native and
> > > > > > security-conscious environments.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > *Solution: *
> > > > > >
> > > > > > This KIP proposes adding support for *client assertion* as an
> > > > alternative
> > > > > > authentication method for the client_credentials grant type, as
> > > defined
> > > > > in
> > > > > > RFC 7521 and RFC 7523. This enhancement addresses three key
> > > motivators:
> > > > > > Enhanced Security
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The current client secret approach requires storing long-lived
> > > secrets
> > > > in
> > > > > > plain text within configuration files. This creates several
> security
> > > > > risks:
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    -
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    Secrets can be accidentally committed to version control
> > > > > >    -
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    Configuration files may be inadvertently exposed through
> backups,
> > > > > logs,
> > > > > >    or monitoring systems
> > > > > >    -
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    Rotating secrets requires coordinating updates across all
> clients
> > > > > >    simultaneously
> > > > > >    -
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    Compromised secrets provide long-term access until manually
> > > rotated
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Client assertion authentication eliminates these risks by using
> > > > > > cryptographic signatures instead of plain text secrets:
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    -
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    *Short-lived assertions*: Each assertion is valid only for a
> brief
> > > > > >    period (typically 5-10 minutes), limiting the window of
> exposure
> > > > > >    -
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    *Private keys never leave the client*: Only the signed
> assertion
> > > is
> > > > > >    transmitted, not the key material itself
> > > > > >    -
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    *Cryptographic proof*: The assertion provides cryptographic
> proof
> > > of
> > > > > the
> > > > > >    client's identity without revealing the secret
> > > > > >    -
> > > > > >
> > > > > >    *Easier rotation*: Private keys can be rotated independently
> with
> > > > > >    automatic file reloading
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Provider Requirements
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Some OAuth 2.0 identity providers require or strongly prefer
> client
> > > > > > assertion over client secrets for security and compliance
> reasons.
> > > > > > Organizations using these providers cannot currently use Kafka's
> > > OAuth
> > > > > > support with the client_credentials grant type. Supporting client
> > > > > assertion
> > > > > > makes Kafka compatible with any RFC 7523-compliant identity
> provider.
> > > > > > Industry StandardClient assertion authentication is a
> widely-adopted
> > > > > OAuth
> > > > > > 2.0 best practice, particularly in enterprise and regulated
> > > > environments.
> > > > > > It is the recommended authentication method in many security
> > > frameworks
> > > > > and
> > > > > > compliance standards. Supporting this standard ensures Kafka
> follows
> > > > > > industry best practices for OAuth authentication.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > *KIP Link - *
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/KAFKA/KIP-1258%3A+Add+Support+for+OAuth+Client+Assertion+to+client_credentials+Grant+Type
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I look forward to your feedback and suggestions.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Regards,
> > > > > > Prabhash Kumar
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
>

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