Actually, I think the metric remains the same assuming the authentication fails when the token lifetime is too long. Negative max config on server counts what would have been killed because maybe client re-auth is not turned on; positive max enables the kill, which is counted by a second metric as proposed. The current proposal had already stated that a non-zero value would disallow an authentication with a token that has too large a lifetime, and that is still the case, I think. But let’s make sure we are on the same page about all this.
Ron > On Sep 17, 2018, at 6:42 AM, Ron Dagostino <rndg...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Hi Rajini. I see what you are saying. The background login refresh thread > does have to factor into the decision for OAUTHBEARER because there is no new > token to re-authenticate with until that refresh succeeds (similarly with > Kerberos), but I think you are right that the interface doesn’t necessarily > have to be public. The server does decide the time for PLAIN and the > SCRAM-related mechanisms under the current proposal, but it is done in > SaslHandshakeResponse, and at that point the server won’t have any token yet; > making it happen via SaslAuthenticateRequest at the very end does allow the > server to know everything for all mechanisms. > > I see two potential issues to discuss. First, the server must communicate a > time that exceeds the (token or ticket) refresh period on the client. > Assuming it communicates the expiration time of the token/ticket, that’s the > best it can do. So I think that’ll be fine. > > The second issue is what happens if the server is configured to accept a max > value — say, an hour — and the token is good for longer. I assumed that the > client should not be allowed to authenticate in the first place because it > could then simply re-authenticate with the same token after an hour, which > defeats the motivations for this KIP. So do we agree the max token lifetime > allowed will be enforced at authentication time? Assuming so, then we need > to discuss migration. > > The current proposal includes a metric that can be used to identify if an > OAUTHBEARER client is misconfigured — the number of connections that would > have been killed (could be non-zero when the configured max is a negative > number). Do we still want this type of an indication, and if so, is it still > done the same way — a negative number for max, but instead of counting the > number of kills that would have been done it counts the number of > authentications that would have been failed? > > Ron > >> On Sep 17, 2018, at 6:06 AM, Rajini Sivaram <rajinisiva...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Hi Ron, >> >> Thinking a bit more about other SASL mechanisms, I think the issue is that >> in the current proposal, clients decide the re-authentication period. For >> mechanisms like PLAIN or SCRAM, we would actually want server to determine >> the re-authentication interval. For example, the PLAIN or SCRAM database >> could specify the expiry time for each principal, or the broker could be >> configured with a single expiry time for all principals of that mechanism. >> For OAuth, brokers do know the expiry time. Haven't figured out what to do >> with Kerberos, but in any case for broker-side connection termination on >> expiry, we need the broker to know/decide the expiry time. So I would like >> to suggest a slightly different approach to managing re-authentications. >> >> 1) Instead of changing SASL_HANDSHAKE version number, we bump up >> SASL_AUTHENTICATE version number. >> 2) In the final SASL_AUTHENTICATE response, broker returns the expiry time >> of this authenticated session. This is the interval after which broker will >> terminate the connection If it wasn't re-authenticated. >> 3) We no longer need the public interface change to add ` >> org.apache.kafka.common.security.expiring.ExpiringCredential` for the >> client-side. Instead we schedule the next re-authentication on the client >> based on the expiry time provided by the server (some time earlier than the >> expiry). >> 4) If client uses SASL_AUTHENTICATE v0, broker will not return expiry time. >> The connection will be terminated if that feature is enabled (the same code >> path as client failing to re-authenticte on time). >> >> Thoughts? >> >>> On Sat, Sep 15, 2018 at 3:06 AM, Ron Dagostino <rndg...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Hi everyone. I've updated the KIP to reflect all discussion to date, >>> including the decision to go with the low-level approach. This latest >>> version of the KIP includes the above "connections.max.reauth.ms" >>> proposal, >>> which I know has not been discussed yet. It mentions new metrics, some of >>> which may not have been discussed either (and names are missing from some >>> of them). Regardless, this new version is the closest yet to a version >>> that can be put to a vote next week. >>> >>> Ron >>> >>>> On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 8:59 PM Ron Dagostino <rndg...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Minor correction: I'm proposing "connections.max.reauth.ms" as the >>>> broker-side configuration property, not " >>>> connections.max.expired.credentials.ms". >>>> >>>> Ron >>>> >>>>> On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 8:40 PM Ron Dagostino <rndg...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Rajini. I'm going to choose *connections.max.expired.credentials.ms >>>>> <http://connections.max.expired.credentials.ms>* as the option name >>>>> because it is consistent with the comment I made in the section about >>> how >>>>> to get the client and server to agree on credential lifetime: >>>>> >>>>> "We could add a new API call so that clients could ask servers for the >>>>> lifetime they use, or we could extend the SaslHandshakeRequest/Response >>> API >>>>> call to include that information in the server's response – the client >>>>> would then adopt that value" >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> We set the config option value on the broker (with the " >>>>> listener.name.mechanism." prefix), and we will return the configured >>>>> value in the SaslHandshakeResponse (requiring a wire format change in >>>>> addition to a version bump). The value (referred to as "X" below) can >>> be >>>>> negative, zero, or positive and is to be interpreted as follows: >>>>> >>>>> X = 0: Fully disable. The server will respond to re-authentications, >>> but >>>>> it won't kill any connections due to expiration, and it won't track >>> either >>>>> of the 2 metrics mentioned below. >>>>> >>>>> Now, a couple of definitions for when X != 0: >>>>> >>>>> 1) We define the *maximum allowed expiration time* to be the time >>>>> determined by the point when (re-)authentication occurs plus |X| >>>>> milliseconds. >>>>> 2) We define the *requested expiration time* to be the maximum allowed >>>>> expiration time except for the case of an OAuth bearer token, in which >>> case >>>>> it is the point at which the token expires. (Kerberos presumably also >>>>> specifies a ticket lifetime, but frankly I am not in a position to do >>> any >>>>> Kerberos-related coding in time for a 2.1.0 release and would prefer to >>>>> ignore this piece of information for this KIP -- would it be acceptable >>> to >>>>> have someone else add it later?). >>>>> >>>>> Based on these definitions, we define the behavior as follows: >>>>> >>>>> *X > 0: Fully enable* >>>>> A) The server will reject any authentication/re-authentication attempt >>>>> when the requested expiration time is after the maximum allowed >>> expiration >>>>> time (which could only happen with an OAuth bearer token, assuming we >>> skip >>>>> dealing with Kerberos for now). >>>>> B) The server will kill connections that are used beyond the requested >>>>> expiration time. >>>>> C) A broker metric will be maintained that documents the number >>>>> connections killed by the broker. This metric will be non-zero if a >>> client >>>>> is connecting to the broker with re-authentication either unavailable >>> (i.e. >>>>> an older client) or disabled. >>>>> >>>>> *X < 0: Partially enable* >>>>> A) Same as above: the server will reject any >>>>> authentication/re-authentication attempt when the requested expiration >>> time >>>>> is after the maximum allowed expiration time (which could only happen >>> with >>>>> an OAuth bearer token, assuming we skip dealing with Kerberos for now). >>>>> B) The server will **not** kill connections that are used beyond the >>>>> requested expiration time. >>>>> C) A broker metric will be maintained that documents the number of API >>>>> requests unrelated to re-authentication that are made over a connection >>>>> beyond the requested expiration time. This metric will be helpful for >>>>> operators to ensure that all clients are properly upgraded and >>>>> re-authenticating before fully enabling the server-side >>>>> expired-connection-kill functionality (i.e. by changing the value from a >>>>> negative number to a positive number): this metric will be zero across >>> all >>>>> brokers when it is safe to fully enable the server-side feature. >>>>> >>>>> Thoughts? >>>>> >>>>> Ron >>>>> >>>>> On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 11:59 AM Rajini Sivaram < >>> rajinisiva...@gmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> It will be good to shorten the config name. We have a config named ` >>>>>> connections.max.idle.ms`. We could add something like ` >>>>>> connections.max.expired.credentials.ms`. As you said, it would be >>>>>> prefixed >>>>>> with listener and SASL mechanism name. We should be able to support >>>>>> connection termination in future even with SSL, so perhaps we don't >>> want >>>>>> the `sasl.server.` prefix (we just need to validate whether the config >>> is >>>>>> supported for the protocol). You can choose whether a boolean flag or a >>>>>> time interval makes more sense. >>>>>> >>>>>> For the client-side, the KIP explains how to make it work for other >>>>>> mechanisms and we can leave it that. Not convinced about server-side >>>>>> though. It seems to me that we probably would require API changes to >>> make >>>>>> it work. Basically the proposed approach works only for OAUTHBEARER. >>>>>> Since >>>>>> we have to bump up SaslHandshakeRequest version in this KIP, it will be >>>>>> good to work out if we need to change the request or flow to make this >>>>>> work >>>>>> for other mechanisms. I haven't figured out exactly what is needed, but >>>>>> will think about it and get back next week. In the meantime, you can >>> get >>>>>> the KIP up-to-date with the config, migration path etc. and get it >>> ready >>>>>> to >>>>>> start vote next week. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 1:24 PM, Ron Dagostino <rndg...@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Rajini. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Agreed, we will bump the SaslHandshakeRequest API number (no wire >>>>>> format >>>>>>> change, of course). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Agreed, responding to re-authentication will always be enabled on the >>>>>>> broker since it is initiated by the client. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Agreed, connection termination by the broker will be opt-in. I'm >>>>>> thinking >>>>>>> *sasl.server.disconnect.expired.credential.connections.enable*, >>>>>> prefixed >>>>>>> with listener and SASL mechanism name in lower-case so it can be >>>>>> opt-in at >>>>>>> the granularity of a SASL mechanism; for example, " >>>>>>> listener.name.sasl_ssl.oauthbearer.sasl.server. >>>>>>> disconnect.expired.credential.connections.enable=true >>>>>>> ". It is long, so if you have a preference for a shorter name let me >>>>>> know >>>>>>> and we'll go with it instead. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Agreed, additional metrics will be helpful. I'll add them to the >>> KIP. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> <<<need to work out exactly how this works with all SASL mechanisms >>>>>>> <<<not sure we have the data required on the broker or a way of >>>>>>> <<< extending the [GSSAPI] mechanism >>>>>>> Not sure I agree here. The paragraph I added to the KIP describes >>> how >>>>>> I >>>>>>> think this can be done. Given that description, do you still feel >>>>>> Kerberos >>>>>>> will not be possible? If Kerberos presents a significant hurdle >>> then I >>>>>>> don't think that should prevent us from doing it for other mechanisms >>>>>> -- I >>>>>>> would rather state that it isn't supported with GSSAPI due to >>>>>> limitations >>>>>>> in Kerberos itself than not have it for OAUTHBEARER, for example. >>> And >>>>>>> right now I don't think we need more than a high-level description of >>>>>> how >>>>>>> this could be done. In other words, I think we have this covered, >>>>>> unless >>>>>>> there is a fundamental problem due to Kerberos not making data (i.e. >>>>>> ticket >>>>>>> expiration) available on the server. I want to submit this KIP for >>> a >>>>>> vote >>>>>>> early next week in the hope of having it accepted by the Monday, 9/24 >>>>>>> deadline for the 2.1.0 release, and if that happens I believe I can >>>>>> get a >>>>>>> PR into really good shape soon thereafter (I'm working on it now). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ron >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 5:57 AM Rajini Sivaram < >>>>>> rajinisiva...@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Ron, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 1) Yes, we should update the version of `SaslHandshakeRequest`. >>>>>> Clients >>>>>>>> would attempt to re-authenticate only if broker's >>>>>> SaslHandshakeRequest >>>>>>>> version >=2. >>>>>>>> 2) I think we should enable broker's re-authentication and >>> connection >>>>>>>> termination code regardless of client version. Re-authentication >>>>>> could be >>>>>>>> always enabled since it is triggered only by clients and broker >>> could >>>>>>> just >>>>>>>> handle it. Connection termination should be opt-in, but should work >>>>>> with >>>>>>>> clients of any version. If turned on and clients are of an older >>>>>> version, >>>>>>>> this would simply force reconnection, which should be ok. >>> Additional >>>>>>>> metrics to monitor expired connections may be useful anyway. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> We also need to work out exactly how this works with all SASL >>>>>> mechanisms. >>>>>>>> In particular, we have ensure that we can make it work with >>> Kerberos >>>>>>> since >>>>>>>> we use the implementation from the JRE and I am not sure we have >>> the >>>>>> data >>>>>>>> required on the broker or a way of extending the mechanism. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thoughts? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 6:56 PM, Ron Dagostino <rndg...@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Rajini. I'm thinking about how we deal with migration. For >>>>>>> example, >>>>>>>>> let's say we have an existing 2.0.0 cluster using >>> SASL/OAUTHBEARER >>>>>> and >>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>> want to use this feature. The desired end state is to have all >>>>>> clients >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> brokers migrated to a version that supports the feature (call it >>>>>> 2.x) >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>> the feature turned on. We need to document the supported path(s) >>>>>> to >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>> end state. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Here are a couple of scenarios with implications: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 1) *Migrate client to 2.x and turn the feature on but broker is >>>>>> still >>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>> 2.0.* In this case the client is going to get an error when it >>>>>> sends >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> SaslHandshakeRequest. We want to avoid this. It seems to me the >>>>>>> client >>>>>>>>> needs to know if the broker has been upgraded to the necessary >>>>>> version >>>>>>>>> before trying to re-authenticate, which makes me believe we need >>> to >>>>>>> bump >>>>>>>>> the API version number in 2.x and the client has to check to see >>>>>> if the >>>>>>>> max >>>>>>>>> version the broker supports meets a minimum standard before >>> trying >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> re-authenticate. Do you agree? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 2) *Migrate broker to 2.x and turn the feature on but client is >>>>>> still >>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>> 2.0*. In this case the broker is going to end up killing >>>>>> connections >>>>>>>>> periodically. Again, we want to avoid this. It's tempting to >>> say >>>>>>>> "don't >>>>>>>>> do this" but I wonder if we can require installations to upgrade >>>>>> all >>>>>>>>> clients before turning the feature on at the brokers. Certainly >>>>>> we can >>>>>>>> say >>>>>>>>> "don't do this" for inter-broker clients -- in other words, we >>> can >>>>>> say >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> all brokers in a cluster should be upgraded before the feature is >>>>>>> turned >>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> for any one of them -- but I don't know about our ability to say >>>>>> it for >>>>>>>>> non-broker clients. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Now we consider the cases where both the brokers and the clients >>>>>> have >>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>> upgraded to 2.x. When and where should the feature be turned on? >>>>>> The >>>>>>>>> inter-broker case is interesting because I don't think think we >>> can >>>>>>>> require >>>>>>>>> installations to restart every broker with a new config where the >>>>>>> feature >>>>>>>>> is turned on at the same time. Do you agree that we cannot >>> require >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>> and therefore must support installations restarting brokers with >>> a >>>>>> new >>>>>>>>> config at whatever pace they need -- which may be quite slow >>>>>> relative >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> token lifetimes? Assuming you do agree, then there is going to >>> be >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> case >>>>>>>>> where some brokers are going to have the feature turned on and >>> some >>>>>>>> clients >>>>>>>>> (definitely inter-broker clients at a minimum) are going to have >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> feature turned off. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The above discussion assumes a single config on the broker side >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> turns >>>>>>>>> on both the inter-broker client re-authentication feature as well >>>>>> as >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> server-side expired-connection-kill feature, but now I'm thinking >>>>>> we >>>>>>> need >>>>>>>>> the ability to turn these features on independently, plus maybe >>> we >>>>>>> need a >>>>>>>>> way to monitor the number of "active, expired" connections to the >>>>>>> server >>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>> that operators can be sure that all clients have been >>>>>> upgraded/enabled >>>>>>>>> before turning on the server-side expired-connection-kill >>> feature. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So the migration plan would be as follows: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 1) Upgrade all brokers to 2.x. >>>>>>>>> 2) After all brokers are upgraded, turn on re-authentication for >>>>>> all >>>>>>>>> brokers at whatever rate is desired -- just eventually, at some >>>>>> point, >>>>>>>> get >>>>>>>>> the client-side feature turned on for all brokers so that >>>>>> inter-broker >>>>>>>>> connections are re-authenticating. >>>>>>>>> 3) In parallel with (1) and (2) above, upgrade clients to 2.x and >>>>>> turn >>>>>>>>> their re-authentication feature on. Clients will check the API >>>>>> version >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> only re-authenticate to a broker that has also been upgraded >>> (note >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> ability of a broker to respond to a re-authentication cannot be >>>>>> turned >>>>>>>> off >>>>>>>>> -- it is always on beginning with version 2.x, and it just sits >>>>>> there >>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>> nothing if it isn't exercised by an enabled client) >>>>>>>>> 4) After (1), (2), and (3) are complete, check the 2.x broker >>>>>> metrics >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> confirm that there are no "active, expired" connections. Once >>> you >>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> satisfied that (1), (2), and (3) are indeed complete you can >>>>>> enable the >>>>>>>>> server-side expired-connection-kill feature on each broker via a >>>>>>> restart >>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>> whatever pace is desired. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Comments? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ron >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 4:48 PM Ron Dagostino <rndg...@gmail.com >>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ok, I am tempted to just say we go with the low-level approach >>>>>> since >>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> the quickest and seems to meet the clear requirements. We can >>>>>> always >>>>>>>>> adjust >>>>>>>>>> later if we get to clarity on other requirements or we decide >>> we >>>>>> need >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> approach it differently for whatever reason. But in the >>>>>> meantime, >>>>>>>> before >>>>>>>>>> fully committing to this decision, I would appreciate another >>>>>>>> perspective >>>>>>>>>> if someone has one. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ron >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 3:15 PM Rajini Sivaram < >>>>>>>> rajinisiva...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Ron, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Yes, I would leave out retries from this KIP for now. In the >>>>>> future, >>>>>>>> if >>>>>>>>>>> there is a requirement for supporting retries, we can consider >>>>>> it. I >>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>> we can support retries with either approach if we needed to, >>>>>> but it >>>>>>>>> would >>>>>>>>>>> be better to do it along with other changes required to >>> support >>>>>>>>>>> authentication servers that are not highly available. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> For maintainability, I am biased, so it will be good to get >>> the >>>>>>>>>>> perspective >>>>>>>>>>> of others in the community :-) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 7:47 PM, Ron Dagostino < >>>>>> rndg...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Rajini. Here is some feedback/some things I thought of. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> First, I just realized that from a timing perspective that I >>>>>> am >>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>> sure >>>>>>>>>>>> retry is going to be necessary. The background login >>> refresh >>>>>>> thread >>>>>>>>>>>> triggers re-authentication when it refreshes the client's >>>>>>>> credential. >>>>>>>>>>> The >>>>>>>>>>>> OAuth infrastructure has to be available in order for this >>>>>> refresh >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> succeed (the background thread repeatedly retries if it >>> can't >>>>>>>> refresh >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> credential, and that retry loop handles any temporary >>>>>> outage). If >>>>>>>>>>> clients >>>>>>>>>>>> are told to re-authenticate when the credential is refreshed >>>>>> **and >>>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>> actually re-authenticate at that point** then it is highly >>>>>>> unlikely >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> the OAuth infrastructure would fail within those intervening >>>>>>>>>>> milliseconds. >>>>>>>>>>>> So we don't need re-authentication retry in this KIP as long >>>>>> as >>>>>>>> retry >>>>>>>>>>>> starts immediately. The low-level prototype as currently >>>>>> coded >>>>>>>>> doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>> actually start re-authentication until the connection is >>>>>>>> subsequently >>>>>>>>>>> used, >>>>>>>>>>>> and that could take a while. But then again, if the >>>>>> connection >>>>>>>> isn't >>>>>>>>>>> used >>>>>>>>>>>> for some period of time, then the lost value of having to >>>>>> abandon >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> connection is lessened anyway. Plus, as you pointed out, >>>>>> OAuth >>>>>>>>>>>> infrastructure is assumed to be highly available. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Does this makes sense, and would you be willing to say that >>>>>> retry >>>>>>>>> isn't >>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> necessary requirement? I'm tempted but would like to hear >>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>>> perspective >>>>>>>>>>>> first. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Interleaving/latency and maintainability (more than lines of >>>>>> code) >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> two remaining areas of comparison. I did not add the >>>>>>>> maintainability >>>>>>>>>>> issue >>>>>>>>>>>> to the KIP yet, but before I do I thought I would address it >>>>>> here >>>>>>>>> first >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> see if we can come to consensus on it because I'm not sure I >>>>>> see >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> high-level approach as being hard to maintain (yet -- I >>> could >>>>>> be >>>>>>>>>>>> convinced/convince myself; we'll see). I do want to make >>>>>> sure we >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>>> the same page about what is required to add >>> re-authentication >>>>>>>> support >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> the high-level case. Granted, the amount is zero in the >>>>>> low-level >>>>>>>>> case, >>>>>>>>>>>> and it doesn't get any better that that, but the amount in >>> the >>>>>>>>>>> high-level >>>>>>>>>>>> case is very low -- just a few lines of code. For example: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> KafkaAdminClient: >>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/apache/kafka/pull/5582/commits/ >>> 4fa70f38b9 >>>>>>>>>>>> d33428ff98b64a3a2bd668f5f28c38#diff- >>>>>>> 6869b8fccf6b098cbcb0676e8ceb26a7 >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the same few lines of code for KafkaConsumer, >>>>>> KafkaProducer, >>>>>>>>>>>> WorkerGroupMember, and TransactionMarkerChannelManager >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The two synchronous I/O use cases are >>>>>> ControllerChannelManager and >>>>>>>>>>>> ReplicaFetcherBlockingSend (via ReplicaFetcherThread), and >>>>>> they >>>>>>>>> require >>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> little bit more -- but not much. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Thoughts? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Ron >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 1:57 PM Ron Dagostino < >>>>>> rndg...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks, Rajini. Before I digest/respond to that, here's >>> an >>>>>>> update >>>>>>>>>>> that I >>>>>>>>>>>>> just completed. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I added a commit to the PR ( >>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/apache/kafka/pull/5582/) >>>>>>>>>>>>> that implements server-side kill of expired OAUTHBEARER >>>>>>>> connections. >>>>>>>>>>> No >>>>>>>>>>>>> tests yet since we still haven't settled on a final >>> approach >>>>>>>>>>> (low-level >>>>>>>>>>>> vs. >>>>>>>>>>>>> high-level). >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I also updated the KIP to reflect the latest discussion >>> and >>>>>> PR >>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>> follows: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> - Include support for brokers killing connections as >>>>>> part of >>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>> KIP >>>>>>>>>>>>> (rather than deferring it to a future KIP as was >>>>>> originally >>>>>>>>>>>> mentioned; the >>>>>>>>>>>>> PR now includes it as mentioned -- it was very easy to >>>>>> add) >>>>>>>>>>>>> - Added metrics (they will mirror existing ones related >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> authentications; I have not added those to the PR) >>>>>>>>>>>>> - Updated the implementation description to reflect the >>>>>>> current >>>>>>>>>>> state >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the PR, which is a high-level, one-size-fits-all >>>>>> approach >>>>>>>> (as >>>>>>>>>>>> opposed to >>>>>>>>>>>>> my initial, even-higher-level approach) >>>>>>>>>>>>> - Added a "Rejected Alternative" for the first version >>>>>> of the >>>>>>>> PR, >>>>>>>>>>>>> which injected requests directly into synchronous I/O >>>>>>> clients' >>>>>>>>>>> queues >>>>>>>>>>>>> - Added a "Rejected Alternative" for the low-level >>>>>> approach >>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>> suggested, but of course we have not formally decided >>> to >>>>>>> reject >>>>>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>> approach or adopt the current PR implementation. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I'll think about where we stand some more before >>> responding >>>>>>> again. >>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks >>>>>>>>>>>>> for the above reply. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ron >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 1:36 PM Rajini Sivaram < >>>>>>>>>>> rajinisiva...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Ron, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for summarising, I think it covers the >>>>>> differences >>>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> two approaches well. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> A few minor points to answer the questions in there: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1) When re-authetication is initiated in the Selector >>>>>> during >>>>>>>>> poll(), >>>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>>>> move an idle channel to re-authentication state. It is >>>>>> similar >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> injecting >>>>>>>>>>>>>> requests, but achieved by changing channel back to >>>>>>> authenticating >>>>>>>>>>> state. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3) To clarify why I think re-authentication should fit in >>>>>> with >>>>>>>> our >>>>>>>>>>>>>> authentication design: My point was not about a specific >>>>>>>> connection >>>>>>>>>>>> being >>>>>>>>>>>>>> usable or not usable. It was about what happens at the >>>>>> client >>>>>>> API >>>>>>>>>>> level. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Our client API (producer/consumer/admin client etc.) >>>>>> currently >>>>>>>>> assume >>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a single broker authentication failure is a fatal error >>>>>> that is >>>>>>>>> never >>>>>>>>>>>>>> retried because we assume that broker only ever fails an >>>>>>>>>>> authentication >>>>>>>>>>>>>> request if credentials are invalid. If we ever decide to >>>>>>> support >>>>>>>>>>> cases >>>>>>>>>>>>>> where broker occasionally fails an authentication request >>>>>> due >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> transient failure, we need to do more around how we >>> handle >>>>>>>>>>>> authentication >>>>>>>>>>>>>> failures in clients. We may decide that it is ok to close >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>> for authentication and not for re-authentication as you >>>>>>>> mentioned, >>>>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>> need to change the way this disconnection is handled by >>>>>>> clients. >>>>>>>> So >>>>>>>>>>> IMO, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>> should either add support for transient retriable >>>>>>> authentication >>>>>>>>>>>> failures >>>>>>>>>>>>>> properly or not retry for any scenario. Personally, I >>> don't >>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>> would >>>>>>>>>>>>>> want to retry all authentication failures even if it is a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication, I think we could (at some point in >>>>>> future), >>>>>>>>> allow >>>>>>>>>>>>>> brokers to return an error code that indicates that it >>> is a >>>>>>>>> transient >>>>>>>>>>>>>> broker-side failure rather than invalid credentials and >>>>>> handle >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> error >>>>>>>>>>>>>> differently. I see no reason at that point why we >>> wouldn't >>>>>>> handle >>>>>>>>>>>>>> authentication and re-authentication in the same way. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 4) As you said, the high-level approach would be bigger >>>>>> than >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> low-level >>>>>>>>>>>>>> approach in terms of LOC. But I wouldn't be too concerned >>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>>> lines of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> code. My bigger concern was about modularity. Our >>> security >>>>>> code >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>> already >>>>>>>>>>>>>> complex, protocols like Kerberos and SSL that we use from >>>>>> the >>>>>>> JRE >>>>>>>>>>> make >>>>>>>>>>>>>> problem diagnosis hard. Async I/O makes the networking >>> code >>>>>>>>> complex. >>>>>>>>>>> You >>>>>>>>>>>>>> need to understand networking layer to work with the >>>>>> security >>>>>>>>> layer, >>>>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the rest of the code base doesn't rely on knowledge of >>>>>>>>>>> network/security >>>>>>>>>>>>>> layers. My main concern about the high-level approach is >>>>>> that >>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>> spans >>>>>>>>>>>>>> these boundaries, making it harder to maintain in the >>> long >>>>>> run. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Sep 12, 2018 at 10:23 AM, Stanislav Kozlovski < >>>>>>>>>>>>>> stanis...@confluent.io> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Ron, Rajini >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for summarizing the discussion so far, Ron! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1) How often do we have such long-lived connection >>>>>> idleness >>>>>>>> (e.g >>>>>>>>>>> 5-10 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> minutes) in practice? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3) I agree that retries for re-authentication are >>> useful. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 4) The interleaving of requests sounds like a great >>>>>> feature >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> have, >>>>>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the tradeoff against code complexity is a tough one. I >>>>>> would >>>>>>>>>>>> personally >>>>>>>>>>>>>> go >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with the simpler approach since you could always add >>>>>>>> interleaving >>>>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>>>>> top if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the community decides the latency should be better. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Best, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Stanislav >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Sep 11, 2018 at 5:00 AM Ron Dagostino < >>>>>>>> rndg...@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi everyone. I've updated the PR to reflect the >>> latest >>>>>>>>>>> conclusions >>>>>>>>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this ongoing discussion. The KIP still needs the >>>>>> suggested >>>>>>>>>>>> updates; I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do that later this week. II agree with Rajini that >>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>> additional >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> feedback from the community at large would be very >>>>>> helpful >>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>> point >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here's where we stand. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We have 2 separate implementations for >>>>>> re-authenticating >>>>>>>>> existing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connections -- a so-called "low-level" approach and a >>>>>>>>> (relatively >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> speaking) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "high-level" approach -- and we agree on how they >>>>>> should be >>>>>>>>>>>> compared. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Specifically, Rajini has provided a mechanism that >>>>>> works >>>>>>> at a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> relatively >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> low level in the stack by intercepting network sends >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> queueing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> them up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while re-authentication happens; then the queued >>> sends >>>>>> are >>>>>>>> sent >>>>>>>>>>>> after >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication succeeds, or the connection is >>>>>> closed if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication fails. See the prototype commit at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/rajinisivaram/kafka/commit/ >>>>>>> b9d711907ad843 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> c11d17e80d6743bfb1d4e3f3fd >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> . >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I have an implementation that works higher up in the >>>>>> stack; >>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>> injects >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> authentication requests into the KafkaClient via a >>> new >>>>>>> method >>>>>>>>>>> added >>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interface, and the implementation (i.e. >>> NetworkClient) >>>>>>> sends >>>>>>>>> them >>>>>>>>>>>> when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> poll() is called. The updated PR is available at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://github.com/apache/kafka/pull/5582/. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here is how we think these two approaches should be >>>>>>> compared. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1) *When re-authentication starts*. The low-level >>>>>> approach >>>>>>>>>>>> initiates >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication only if/when the connection is >>>>>> actually >>>>>>>> used, >>>>>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> start after the existing credential expires; the >>>>>> current PR >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> implementation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> injects re-authentication requests into the existing >>>>>> flow, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication starts immediately regardless of >>>>>> whether >>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection is being used for something else. Rajini >>>>>>> believes >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> low-level >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approach can be adjusted to re-authenticate idle >>>>>>> connections >>>>>>>>>>>> (Rajini, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> don't see how this can be done without injecting >>>>>> requests, >>>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> what >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the high-level connection is doing, but I am probably >>>>>>> missing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> no need to go into it unless it is easy to explain.) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2) *When requests not related to re-authentication >>> are >>>>>> able >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> use >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authenticating connection*. The low-level >>> approach >>>>>>>> finishes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication completely before allowing anything >>>>>> else >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> traverse >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection, and we agree that this is how the >>> low-level >>>>>>>>>>>> implementation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work without significant work/changes. The current >>> PR >>>>>>>>>>>> implementation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interleaves re-authentication requests with the >>>>>> existing >>>>>>> flow >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asynchronous I/O uses cases (Consumer, Producer, >>> Admin >>>>>>>> Client, >>>>>>>>>>>> etc.), >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it allows the two synchronous use cases >>>>>>>>> (ControllerChannelManager >>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ReplicaFetcherBlockingSend/ReplicaFetcherThread) to >>>>>> decide >>>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>>>>>> style >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> want. I (somewhat arbitrarily, to prove out the >>>>>>> flexibility >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> high-level approach) coded ControllerChannelManager >>> to >>>>>> do >>>>>>>>>>> complete, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> non-interleaved re-authentication and >>>>>>>>> ReplicaFetcherBlockingSend/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ReplicaFetcherThread to interleave requests. The >>>>>> approach >>>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>>>>>>> impacts on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the maximum size of latency spikes: interleaving >>>>>> requests >>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>> decrease >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> latency. The benefit of interleaving is tough to >>>>>> evaluate >>>>>>>>>>> because >>>>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clear what the latency requirement really is. Note >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can entail several network round-trips between the >>>>>> client >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> broker. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Comments in this area would be especially >>> appreciated. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3) *What happens if re-authentication fails (i.e. >>> retry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> capability)*. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think this is where we have not yet settled on what >>> the >>>>>>>>>>> requirement >>>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (even more so than the issue of potential latency >>>>>>> mitigation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements). Rajini, you had mentioned that >>>>>>>>> re-authentication >>>>>>>>>>>>>> should >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work the same way as authentication, but I see the >>> two >>>>>>>>>>> situations as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> asymmetric. In the authentication case, if >>>>>> authentication >>>>>>>>> fails, >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection was never fully established and could not >>> be >>>>>>> used, >>>>>>>>>>> and it >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closed -- TLS negotiation may have taken place, so >>> that >>>>>>>> effort >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> lost, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> beyond that nothing else is lost. In the >>>>>> re-authentication >>>>>>>>> case >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection is fully established, it is in use, and in >>>>>> fact >>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>>>> remain >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> use for some time going forward as long as the >>> existing >>>>>>>>>>> credential >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unexpired; abandoning it at this point due to a >>>>>>>>> re-authentication >>>>>>>>>>>>>> failure >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (which can occur due to no fault of the client -- >>> i.e. >>>>>> a >>>>>>>> remote >>>>>>>>>>>>>> directory >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or OAuth server being temporarily down) abandons a >>>>>> fully >>>>>>>>>>> functioning >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection with remaining lifetime. Am I thinking >>>>>> about >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasonably? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I still tend to believe that retries of failed >>>>>>>>> re-authentications >>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 4) *Size*. The low-level approach is smaller in terms >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> code. >>>>>>>>>>> It >>>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prototype, so it doesn't have everything the >>> high-level >>>>>>>>> approach >>>>>>>>>>>> has, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have split the PR for the high-level approach into >>> two >>>>>>>> separate >>>>>>>>>>>>>> commits >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> facilitate a more apples-to-apples comparison: the >>>>>> first >>>>>>>> commit >>>>>>>>>>>>>> contains >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> infrastructure that would have to be added to the >>>>>> low-level >>>>>>>>>>>> prototype >>>>>>>>>>>>>> if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> went with that, and the second commit has everything >>>>>>> specific >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> high-level approach. So comparing the low-level >>>>>> prototype >>>>>>>>> commit >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (~350 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> changes) to the second commit in the high-level PR >>>>>> (~1400 >>>>>>>>>>> changes) >>>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reasonable. The high-level approach at this point is >>>>>> about >>>>>>> 4 >>>>>>>>>>> times >>>>>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> big, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though it does have lots of error/sanity checking and >>>>>>>>>>> functionality >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as retry) that would to at least some degree have to >>> be >>>>>>> added >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> low-level implementation. Still, the high-level >>>>>> approach >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> (and >>>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> likely remain) somewhat bigger than the low-level >>>>>> approach. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I hope I presented this in a balanced and accurate >>> way; >>>>>>>> Rajini, >>>>>>>>>>>> please >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> correct me if I got anything wrong or left out >>> anything >>>>>>>>>>> important. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Apologies in advance if that is the case -- it is >>>>>>> unintended. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Again, comments/discussion from the wider community >>> at >>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>> juncture >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be especially appreciated. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ron >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 7:42 AM Rajini Sivaram < >>>>>>>>>>>>>> rajinisiva...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Ron, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for the analysis. Yes, I agree with the >>>>>>>> differences >>>>>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pointed out between the two approaches. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1. Re-authenticating idle connections (or >>>>>> connections >>>>>>>>>>> nearing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> idle >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> timeout): With the lower-level approach, there >>> is >>>>>>>> nothing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> stopping >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> us >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authenticating idle connections. We could >>>>>> either >>>>>>>>> consider >>>>>>>>>>>> idle >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connections for re-authentication or we could >>>>>>> implement >>>>>>>>>>> code in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> broker >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kill connections that deals with delays >>>>>> introduced by >>>>>>>>>>> idleness. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expect token lifetimes to be much higher than >>>>>>> connection >>>>>>>>>>> expiry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> either would work. And the second approach is >>>>>> probably >>>>>>>>>>> better. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. Interleaving authentication requests and >>>>>>> application >>>>>>>>>>>> requests >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reduce impact on latency: It is not impossible >>> to >>>>>>>>> interleave >>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> low-level approach, but it adds complexity and >>>>>> reduces >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> value >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approach. So it will be good to understand the >>>>>>>>> requirements >>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> terms >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> latency. In terms of comparing the two >>>>>> approaches, it >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> fair >>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> compare >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> non-interleaved low-level with the naturally >>>>>>> interleaved >>>>>>>>>>>>>> high-level >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approach. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3. Retries: I don't think requirement for >>> retries >>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> different >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> authentication and re-authentication from a >>>>>> client's >>>>>>>> point >>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> view. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> should either support retries for both or not at >>>>>> all. >>>>>>> We >>>>>>>>>>>>>> currently >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> authentication failures as fatal errors. We >>> expect >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> if >>>>>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> external authentication servers, those servers >>>>>> will be >>>>>>>>>>> highly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> available. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Our built-in authentication mechanisms avoid >>>>>> accessing >>>>>>>>>>> external >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> servers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the authentication path (during authentication, >>>>>>>>>>> verification is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> performed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> using private/public keys or cache lookup). This >>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> necessary >>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> our >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> design >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> since authentications are performed >>> synchronously >>>>>> on >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> network >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thread. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One more point with the lower-level mechanism: If >>>>>> one day >>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>> decided >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we want to extend this for SSL, it would be >>> possible >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> change >>>>>>>>>>>> just >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transport layer and make it work for SSL. We may >>>>>> never >>>>>>> want >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> do >>>>>>>>>>>>>> this, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thought I would point out anyway. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the next step would be to add the low-level >>>>>>>> approach >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> KIP >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> under `Rejected Alternatives` with details on the >>>>>>>>> differences. >>>>>>>>>>> And >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> detail on requirements covering latency and retries >>>>>> in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> body of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> KIP. For "Rejected Alternatives", can we add >>>>>>> sub-sections >>>>>>>> (I >>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are two approaches there now, but you need to read >>>>>>> through >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> figure >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> out, so sub-titles would help). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Once the KIP is updated, it will be good to get >>> more >>>>>>>> feedback >>>>>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> community to decide on the approach to adopt. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Sep 8, 2018 at 1:27 PM, Ron Dagostino < >>>>>>>>>>> rndg...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi yet again, Rajini. If we decide that >>>>>> interleaving >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> impossible >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the low-level approach but we still want to at >>>>>> least >>>>>>>>> support >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibility given that it reduces the size of >>>>>> latency >>>>>>>>> spikes, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> then I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> have a suggestion. I documented in the KIP how I >>>>>>>> rejected >>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> single, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one-size-fits-all queue approach because we don't >>>>>> know >>>>>>>> when >>>>>>>>>>>> poll() >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> called in the synchronous I/O use case. An >>>>>> advantage >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> such an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approach >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- if it would have worked, which it didn't -- is >>>>>> that >>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>> would >>>>>>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transparent to the owner of the NetworkClient >>>>>> instance >>>>>>>>> (this >>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> big advantages of the low-level approach, after >>>>>> all). >>>>>>>> But >>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>> could >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the one-size-fits-all queue approach work if we >>> are >>>>>>>> willing >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> impose >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirements on synchronous I/O users of >>>>>> NetworkClient. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Specifically, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> could add a method to the >>>>>>>>>>> org.apache.kafka.clients.KafkaClient >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interface >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (which NetworkClient implements) as follows: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> /** >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * Return true if any node has >>>>>> re-authentication >>>>>>>>> requests >>>>>>>>>>>>>> waiting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sent. A >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * call to {@link #poll(long, long)} is >>>>>> required to >>>>>>>>> send >>>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requests. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> An owner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * of this instance that does not implement a >>>>>> run >>>>>>>> loop >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> repeatedly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> call >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * {@link #poll(long, long)} but instead only >>>>>> sends >>>>>>>>>>> requests >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> synchronously >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * on-demand must call this method >>>>>> periodically -- >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> invoke >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * {@link #poll(long, long)} if the return >>>>>> value is >>>>>>>>>>> {@code >>>>>>>>>>>>>> true} >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ensure >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * that any re-authentication requests that >>>>>> have >>>>>>> ben >>>>>>>>>>>> injected >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * timely fashion. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> * @return true if any node has >>>>>> re-authentication >>>>>>>>>>> requests >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> waiting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be sent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> */ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> default boolean >>> hasReauthenticationRequests() { >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> return false; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> } >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If we are willing to add an additional method >>> like >>>>>> this >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> make >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> minor >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> adjustments to the code associated with the few >>>>>>>> synchronous >>>>>>>>>>> use >>>>>>>>>>>>>> cases >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the high-level approach will work. We >>>>>> would >>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibility of further parameterizing the various >>>>>>>>> synchronous >>>>>>>>>>>> I/O >>>>>>>>>>>>>> use >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cases. For example, there are currently 3: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ControllerChannelManager >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> KafkaProducer, via Sender >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ReplicaFetcherBlockingSend, via >>>>>> ReplicaFetcherThread >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it conceivable that one of these use cases >>>>>> might be >>>>>>>> more >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> latency-sensitive than others and might desire >>>>>>>>>>> interleaving? A >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> high-level >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approach would give us the option of configuring >>>>>> each >>>>>>> use >>>>>>>>>>> case >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> accordingly. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ron >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 10:50 PM Ron Dagostino < >>>>>>>>>>>> rndg...@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi again, Rajini. It occurs to me that from a >>>>>>>> *behavior* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perspective >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there are really 3 fundamental differences >>>>>> between >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> low-level >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approach >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you provided and the high-level approach as it >>>>>>>> currently >>>>>>>>>>>> exists >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> PR: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1) *When re-authentication starts*. The >>>>>> low-level >>>>>>>>> approach >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> initiates >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication only if/when the connection >>> is >>>>>>>> actually >>>>>>>>>>>> used, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> start after the existing credential expires; >>> the >>>>>>>> current >>>>>>>>> PR >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> implementation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> injects re-authentication requests into the >>>>>> existing >>>>>>>>> flow, >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication starts immediately regardless >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> whether >>>>>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection is being used for something else. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2) *When requests not related to >>>>>> re-authentication >>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>> use >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authenticating connection*. The low-level >>>>>>> approach >>>>>>>>>>>> finishes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication completely before allowing >>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>> else >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> travers >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection; the current PR implementation >>>>>> interleaves >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requests with existing flow requests. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3) *What happens if re-authentication fails*. >>>>>> The >>>>>>>>>>> low-level >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approach >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> results in a closed connection and does not >>>>>> support >>>>>>>>>>> retries -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> least >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> currently implemented; the current PR >>>>>> implementation >>>>>>>>>>> supports >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> retries. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do you agree that these are the (only?) >>>>>> behavioral >>>>>>>>>>>> differences? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For these facets of behavior, I wonder what the >>>>>>>>>>> requirements >>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> feature. I think they are as follows: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1) *When re-authentication starts*: I don't >>>>>> think we >>>>>>>>> have a >>>>>>>>>>>> hard >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement here when considered in isolation >>> -- >>>>>>>> whether >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> starts immediately or is delayed until the >>>>>> connection >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> used >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probably >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doesn't matter. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2) *When requests not related to >>>>>> re-authentication >>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>> use >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authenticating connection*: there is a >>>>>> tradeoff >>>>>>> here >>>>>>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> latency >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and ability to debug re-authentication >>> problems. >>>>>>>>> Delaying >>>>>>>>>>> use >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection until re-authentication finishes >>>>>> results >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> bigger >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> latency >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> spikes but keeps re-authentication requests >>>>>> somewhat >>>>>>>>>>> together; >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interleaving >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> minimizes the size of individual latency spikes >>>>>> but >>>>>>>> adds >>>>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> separation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> between the requests. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 3) *What happens if re-authentication fails*: I >>>>>>> believe >>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clear >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requirement for retry capability given what I >>>>>> have >>>>>>>>> written >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> previously. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Do >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you agree? Note that while the current >>> low-level >>>>>>>>>>>> implementation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> does >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> support retry, I have been thinking about how >>>>>> that >>>>>>> can >>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>>>>> done, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pretty sure it can be. We can keep the old >>>>>>>>> authenticators >>>>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> client >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and server sides and put them back into place >>> if >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fails; we would also have to make sure the >>> server >>>>>>> side >>>>>>>>>>> doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> delay >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> failed re-authentication result and also >>> doesn't >>>>>>> close >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication failure. I think I see how >>> to >>>>>> do >>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> that. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There are some interactions between the above >>>>>>>>> requirements. >>>>>>>>>>>> If >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication can't start immediately and >>>>>> has to >>>>>>>> wait >>>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection to be used then that precludes >>>>>>> interleaving >>>>>>>>>>> because >>>>>>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sure that the credential will be active by the >>>>>> time >>>>>>> it >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> used >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't active, and we allow interleaving, then >>>>>>> requests >>>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>>>>>> related >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication will fail if server-side >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection-close-due-to-expired-credential >>>>>>>>> functionality is >>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Also >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> note that any such server-side >>>>>>> connection-close-due-to- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expired-credential >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> functionality would likely have to avoid >>> closing >>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>> connection >>>>>>>>>>>>>> until >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used for anything other than re-authentication >>>>>> -- it >>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>>>>> allow >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication requests through when the >>>>>>> credential >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> expired. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Given all of the above, it feels to me like the >>>>>>>> low-level >>>>>>>>>>>>>> solution >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> viable only under the following conditions: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1) We must accept a delay in when >>>>>> re-authentication >>>>>>>>> occurs >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection is used >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2) We must accept the bigger latency spikes >>>>>>> associated >>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interleaving requests >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Does this sound right to you, and if so, do you >>>>>> find >>>>>>>>> these >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conditions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> acceptable? Or have I missed something and/or >>>>>> made >>>>>>>>>>> incorrect >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assumptions >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> somewhere? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ron >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Sep 7, 2018 at 5:19 PM Ron Dagostino < >>>>>>>>>>>> rndg...@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Rajini. The code really helped me to >>>>>> understand >>>>>>>> what >>>>>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>>>>>> were >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thinking -- thanks. I'm still digesting, but >>>>>> here >>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>> quick >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> observations: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Your approach (I'll call it the "low-level" >>>>>>> approach, >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> compared >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> existing PR, which works at a higher level of >>>>>>>>>>> abstraction) -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> low-level >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approach is certainly intriguing. The smaller >>>>>> code >>>>>>>> size >>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> welcome, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course, as is the fact that re-authentication >>>>>> simply >>>>>>>>> works >>>>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> everyone >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> regardless of the style of use (async vs. sync >>>>>> I/O). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I did notice that re-authentication of the >>>>>>> connection >>>>>>>>>>> starts >>>>>>>>>>>>>> only >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if/when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the client uses the connection. For example, >>>>>> if I >>>>>>>> run a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> console >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> producer, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication does not happen unless I try >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> produce >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> something. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the one hand this is potentially good -- if >>> the >>>>>>> client >>>>>>>>>>> isn't >>>>>>>>>>>>>> using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection then the connection stays "silent" >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> could >>>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> closed >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> server side if it stays idle long enough -- >>>>>> whereas >>>>>>> if >>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>> start >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> injecting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authentication requests (as is done in the >>>>>>>> high-level >>>>>>>>>>>>>> approach) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection never goes completely silent and >>>>>> could >>>>>>> (?) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> potentially >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> avoid >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being closed due to idleness. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, if we implement sever-side kill of >>>>>>>> connections >>>>>>>>>>> using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expired >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> credentials (which we agree is needed), then >>> we >>>>>>> might >>>>>>>>> end >>>>>>>>>>> up >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> broker killing connections that are sitting >>>>>> idle for >>>>>>>>> only >>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> short >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> period of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time. For example, if we refresh the token on >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> client >>>>>>>>>>>> side >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tell >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection that it is eligible to be >>>>>>> re-authenticated, >>>>>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> conceivable that the connection might be >>> sitting >>>>>>> idle >>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> point >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> might not be used until after the token it is >>>>>>>> currently >>>>>>>>>>> using >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expires. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> server might kill the connection, and that >>> would >>>>>>> force >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> client >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-connect with a new connection (requiring >>> TLS >>>>>>>>>>> negotiation). >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> probability of this happening increases as the >>>>>> token >>>>>>>>>>> lifetime >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> decreases, of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course, and it can be offset by decreasing the >>>>>>> window >>>>>>>>>>> factor >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (i.e. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> eligible for re-authenticate at 50% of the >>>>>> lifetime >>>>>>>>> rather >>>>>>>>>>>> than >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 80%, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> example -- it would have to sit idle for >>> longer >>>>>>> before >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> server >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tried >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kill it). We haven't implemented server-side >>>>>> kill >>>>>>>> yet, >>>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>>>>>> maybe >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> could >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> make it intelligent and only kill the >>>>>> connection if >>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>> used >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> anything except re-authentication) after the >>>>>>>> expiration >>>>>>>>>>>> time... >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I also wonder about the ability to add retry >>>>>> into >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> low-level >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approach. Do you think it would be possible? >>>>>> It >>>>>>>>> doesn't >>>>>>>>>>>> seem >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> me -- at least not without some big changes >>> that >>>>>>> would >>>>>>>>>>>>>> eliminate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the advantage of being able to reuse the >>>>>> existing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> authentication >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> code. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason I ask is because I think retry is >>>>>> necessary. >>>>>>>> It >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> part of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> refreshes work for both GSSAPI and OAUTHBEARER >>>>>> -- >>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>> refresh >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> based >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some window factor (i.e. 80%) and implement >>>>>> periodic >>>>>>>>> retry >>>>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> failure >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that they can maximize the chances of having a >>>>>> new >>>>>>>>>>> credential >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> available >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> any new connection attempt. Without refresh >>> we >>>>>>> could >>>>>>>>> end >>>>>>>>>>> up >>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> situation where the connection still has some >>>>>>> lifetime >>>>>>>>>>> left >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (10%, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 20%, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> whatever) but it tries to re-authenticate and >>>>>> cannot >>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>> no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fault >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its own (i.e. token endpoint down, some >>> Kerberos >>>>>>>>> failure, >>>>>>>>>>>> etc.) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -=- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> connection is closed at that point, and it is >>>>>> then >>>>>>>>> unable >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reconnect >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> because of the same temporary problem. We >>>>>> could end >>>>>>>> up >>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> especially >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ill-timed, temporary outage in some non-Kafka >>>>>> system >>>>>>>>>>> (related >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> OAuth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kerberos, or some LDAP directory) causing all >>>>>>> clients >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kicked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> off >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cluster. Retry capability seems to me to be >>>>>> the way >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mitigate >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> risk. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Anyway, that's it for now. I really like the >>>>>>> approach >>>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> outlined >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> least at this point based on my current >>>>>>> understanding. >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> continue >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> dig in, and I may send more >>>>>> comments/questions. But >>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>> now, I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> lack of retry -- and my >>>>>> definitely-could-be-wrong >>>>>>>> sense >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> can't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> easily be added -- is my biggest concern with >>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>> low-level >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approach. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ron >>>>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>
