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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KNOX-3418?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
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Tamás Hanicz updated KNOX-3418:
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Description: (was: Reported by greybtw
Path traversal in the Knox Admin API resource-management endpoints (PUT
/admin/api/v1/\{providerconfig,descriptors,topologies}/\{name}). The
client-supplied resource name is URL-decoded and validated against
RESOURCE_NAME_PATTERN = ^[\w-/.]+$, whose character class admits / and . (the -
is literal), so a ../ traversal passes validation. The decoded name is then
written via new File(dest, name) + FileUtils.writeStringToFile with no
canonical-path containment check, so an authenticated admin-role user can
write/overwrite a file outside the managed
shared-providers/descriptors/topologies directories, with an attacker-chosen
filename and extension (getFileNameForResource keeps the name verbatim when it
already has a .))
> Improving file access in Admin API
> ----------------------------------
>
> Key: KNOX-3418
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KNOX-3418
> Project: Apache Knox
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: Server
> Affects Versions: 2.1.0, 3.0.0
> Reporter: Tamás Hanicz
> Assignee: Tamás Hanicz
> Priority: Blocker
> Fix For: 3.0.0, 2.1.1
>
> Time Spent: 0.5h
> Remaining Estimate: 0h
>
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