Super, tu fais ça sur la 2.6 steuplé ?

2014/1/20 Bruno <[email protected]>

> Je prends, commit dans les 5 minutes.
>
> --
> Bruno
>
>
> 2014/1/20 Franck Paul <[email protected]>
>
> > Et du coup ça serait pas mal d'inclure un fix dans la 2.6.2 à sortir ces
> > jours…
> >
> >
> > 2014/1/20 Franck Paul <[email protected]>
> >
> > > Tiens, on dirait qu'il faudrait un peu blinder du côté des
> billets/pages
> > > protégés par mot de passe :-p
> > >
> > >  ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> > > From: Charlie Briggs <[email protected]>
> > > Date: 2014/1/20
> > > Subject: Dotclear PHP Object Injection > Potential Remote Code
> Execution
> > > To: [email protected]
> > >
> > >
> > > Hi there,
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > I recently came across Dotclear and decided to briefly look over its
> > > security.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > After doing some code review and grepping for common PHP pitfalls –
> calls
> > > to exec, eval, system, passthru, preg_replace with the e modifier,
> > > unescaped queries, calls to move_uploaded_file with no verification,
> and
> > so
> > > on, I found that in inc/public/lib.urlhandlers.php and
> > > plugins/pages/_public.php there is a call to unserialize() which takes
> > > direct user input via the cookies. For this call to go ahead, you need
> to
> > > access a password-protected post/page.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > # Password protected entry
> > >
> > > if ($post_password != '' && !$_ctx->preview)
> > >
> > > {
> > >
> > >                 # Get passwords cookie
> > >
> > >                 if (isset($_COOKIE['dc_passwd'])) {
> > >
> > >                                 $pwd_cookie =
> > > unserialize($_COOKIE['dc_passwd']);
> > >
> > >                 } else {
> > >
> > >                                 $pwd_cookie = array();
> > >
> > >                 }
> > >
> > >        .....
> > >
> > > }
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Setting the dc_passwd cookie to a serialized object which does not
> exist,
> > > O:4:"Test":0:{}, throws the PHP error “Cannot use object of type
> > > __PHP_Incomplete_Class as array”. For a code execution
> proof-of-concept,
> > if
> > > we create the class “Test” and ensure it is loaded before the
> > unserialize()
> > > runs:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > class Test
> > >
> > > {
> > >
> > >                 function __wakeup()
> > >
> > >                 {
> > >
> > >                                 echo "Hello world";
> > >
> > >                 }
> > >
> > > }
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > The following output is given:
> > >
> > > Hello world
> > >
> > > Fatal error: Cannot use object of type Test as array in
> > > /var/www/dotclear/dotclear/inc/public/lib.urlhandlers.php on line 389
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > I haven’t gone through all the loaded classes to see if any interesting
> > > code execution can occur off-the-bat; however, as plugins can be
> loaded,
> > > it’s possible that a plugin could cause this core vulnerability to
> become
> > > exploitable.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > I have rated the overall risk for this as medium, as it is
> > > context-dependant – i.e. it only works on a password-protected post.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > The recommended fix for this would be to use safe methods of data
> > > exchange, such as PHP’s json_encode() / json_decode().
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Charlie Briggs
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Security Consultant
> > >
> > > MWR InfoSecurity
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > Mobile: +44 (0) 7584 558 782
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Franck
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Franck
> > --
> > Dev mailing list - [email protected] -
> > http://ml.dotclear.org/listinfo/dev
> >
> --
> Dev mailing list - [email protected] -
> http://ml.dotclear.org/listinfo/dev
>



-- 
Franck
-- 
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