On Wed, 2014-05-14 at 17:41 +0300, Jussi Laako wrote: > On 14.5.2014 17:06, Patrick Ohly wrote: > > The problem remains that the current D-Bus mechanism does not allow > > passing this extra information. > > We just included appctx as part of our dbus API.
That works because you have full control over the D-Bus API. It does not work when trying to add access control to an existing API, because it would break the API for apps already using it. At the moment, the patched dbus-daemon will tell clients when (and only when) they ask what the application context of a certain peer is (via GetConnectionSmackContext). This information is not part of the message itself. I don't know how extensible the on-the-wire D-Bus message format is. Perhaps it would be possible to extend the header such that the extra information can be added without affecting parsing by D-Bus clients which are not aware of this extension. This does not address the file access issues pointed out by Rafał, which IMHO is the bigger issue. My feeling at the moment is that several interested bystanders (me included) speculate about how Crosswalk could be secured, but do we have the actual decision makers and implementers involved, too? Who owns security of the web runtime? -- Best Regards, Patrick Ohly The content of this message is my personal opinion only and although I am an employee of Intel, the statements I make here in no way represent Intel's position on the issue, nor am I authorized to speak on behalf of Intel on this matter. _______________________________________________ Dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.tizen.org/listinfo/dev
