On Tue, 2014-06-17 at 08:55 +0200, Tomasz Swierczek wrote:
> 
> >> [Zhang Xu ] Yes, extension is not trusted. The third party can implement 
> >> their
> >> extensions. In crosswalk original API permission design, which has been
> >> dropped because Cynara security framework proposed, extension must
> >> send an IPC to browser process to do permission check before extension talk
> >> to service.
> >
> > You can't trust the extension to send a message to the browser process
> > any more than you can trust it to send a message to Cynara.
> >
> > I was under the impression that ALL communications for services went
> > through the browser process. If you have untrusted application processes
> > talking directly to services we have a very different situation.
> 
> In all these discussions I feel like the thing we miss is the process
> tree for typical Crosswalk application. Who forks() and execs(), who
> does JavaScript, who does rendering and who does calls to external
> services.
>
> Is there any *good* place over internet that we can base our
> discussions on, that you guys (I'm talking mostly to Crosswalk team
> now) can recommend?

I'm not in the Crosswalk team, so let me point to Sakari's post instead:
https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg02734.html

Also see my follow-up questions about the exact role of the extension
process.

The takeaway from that mail thread was that the EP a) looks like a
potentially less privileged app process to the rest of the system and b)
needs to talk to system services to implement some of the Web APIs.

So coming back to the question of SAPI: my opinion is that Crosswalk
does not depend on SAPI specifically. But we *do* need a way to expose
at least some system services and resources securely to Crosswalk.
Whether that is via SAPI, Cynara checks in the services and/or
dbus-daemon (for services accessed via D-Bus) is what we need to decide.

This is the same as running native apps securely.

> Maybe the real question we should start from is what is the native,
> publicly exposed API in Tizen 3.0? Or rather in 3.1?

For native apps, this is hard to answer. I'm with Casey here, we should
focus on web apps first, in which case the question becomes: which
services and system resources does Crosswalk need to access from the
extension process to implement the Web APIs?

We need a default deny for everything and then open up access to these
services and resources selectively after ensuring that access controls
are in place.

-- 
Best Regards, Patrick Ohly

The content of this message is my personal opinion only and although
I am an employee of Intel, the statements I make here in no way
represent Intel's position on the issue, nor am I authorized to speak
on behalf of Intel on this matter.



_______________________________________________
Dev mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.tizen.org/listinfo/dev

Reply via email to