Initially when I thought of this, I imagined that we can still leverage `PropertyDescriptor` and just add new method(s) to handle the sensitive variables. Some thought has to be put on this.
*"It would provide a list of variables that are readable to the current user and one can be selected"* I think this might lead to bad UX. When the number of variables grow, rendering the variables in a drop-down list may not be that good, IMHO. Maybe we can still stick with textbox and do the following: - Once a user enters sensitive variable expression language, the framework does a background check if the user is authorized to use this variable. If the user doesn't have access, render the same and make the component invalid there by preventing it to be enabled/started Only catch is how are we specifying what the user entered is plain password and not EL. Either we can go with the assumption that all sensitive values have to be taken from Variable Registry and only the EL for those variables will have to be provided as the sensitive property value but this would restrict the developers' freedom to choose what approach they want. Or we can tweak the UI and present the option better, like have a checkbox which when checked, will consider that as an EL and evaluate from the variable registry and when not checked, assume that the entered password is plain password and no evaluation needs to happen. - Sivaprasanna On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 12:19 AM, Bryan Bende <[email protected]> wrote: > The policy model would need more thought, but the point would be that > a user can select variable references they have been given permission > to. > > In order to configure the processor that is referencing the variable, > they already need write permissions to that processor, or some parent > in the hierarchy if no specific policy exists. > > > > On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 2:42 PM, Otto Fowler <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > > "It would provide a list of variables that are readable to the current > user > > and one can be selected, just like allowable values or controller > services.” > > > > A person may have rights to configure nifi without knowing the “value” of > > the secure db password ( for example ), but that doesn’t mean they > > don’t have there rights to reference it. > > > > > > > > On April 25, 2018 at 14:15:16, Bryan Bende ([email protected]) wrote: > > > > There is definitely room for improvement here. > > > > Keep in mind that often the sensitive information is specific to a > > given environment. For example you build a flow in dev with your > > db.password. You don't actually want your dev db password to be > > propagated to the next environment, but you do want to be able to set > > a variable placeholder like ${db.password} and leave that placeholder > > so you can just set that variable in the next environment. So to me > > the goal here is how to handle secure variables. > > > > Andy highlighted many of the issues, my proposal would be the > following... > > > > First, we can introduce a concept of a sensitive variable. This would > > be something in the UI where a user can indicate a variable is > > sensitive, maybe a checkbox, and then the framework can store these > > values encrypted (currently all variable values are stored in plain > > text because they aren't meant to be sensitive). > > > > Second, we can introduce policies on sensitive variables so that we > > can restrict who can read them elsewhere, just like policies on > > controller services that determine which controller services show up > > in the drop down of a processor. > > > > Third, we introduce a new kind of PropertyDescriptor that allows > > selecting a variable from the variable registry rather than free-form > > expression language. It would provide a list of variables that are > > readable to the current user and one can be selected, just like > > allowable values or controller services. Ideally we can have a way to > > still allow free form values for people who don't want to use > > variables. > > > > Fourth, anytime variables are evaluated from expression language we > > would prevent evaluating any of these new sensitive variables since we > > have no way of knowing if a user should have access to it from > > free-form EL, so they can only be used from the special > > PropertyDescriptors above. > > > > If we put all this in place then when we save flows to the registry, > > we can leave the variable place-holders in the sensitive properties, > > and then when you import to the next environment you only need to edit > > the variables section and not go through individual processors setting > > sensitive properties. > > > > On Wed, Apr 25, 2018 at 1:06 PM, Andy LoPresto <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Hi Sivaprasanna, > >> > >> This was a topic that was briefly considered earlier in the lifecycle of > >> the > >> project, but was sidelined due to other developments. With the NiFi > >> Registry > >> project, there has been renewed interest in securing sensitive values in > >> the > >> flow and allowing for easier import/export/persistence. There is a > >> placeholder Jira [1] which doesn’t capture significant information about > >> the > >> problem. I think a larger conversation needs to occur which covers the > >> following points (at a minimum, there is plenty of room for additional > >> concerns and use cases): > >> > >> * How the sensitive values are secured (encryption, storage [HSM [2], > >> Hashicorp Vault [3], Square KeyWhiz [4], JCEKS, locally-encrypted file], > >> location) > >> * User access control (granularity, integration with UAC policies in > NiFi, > >> Ranger, users/groups, etc.) > >> * Exporting/persistence behavior (should a sensitive value entered in > >> “dev” > >> be exported to “prod” (and more significantly, vice-versa), which > >> instance(s) of the Variable Registry are allowed to be referenced from > >> each > >> NiFi / Registry node, etc.) > >> * Variable references (how does the tool differentiate between > >> “${db.password}” meaning “load the variable db.password” and a literal > >> password like “myPass${word!&”? > >> > >> The original Jira for encrypted configuration files / properties [5] > also > >> referenced some of these concepts in the abstract, and there is a rough > >> security roadmap in the wiki [6]. The Variable Registry design document > >> [7] > >> specifically did not allow for sensitive values to be exposed via UI or > >> API. > >> > >> I think there is an appetite for a more complete solution to this > problem > >> as > >> you outlined, but I think there needs to be an extensive collection of > >> actual use cases, user expectations, and then technical discussion on > the > >> implementation to solve this successfully. It’s a minefield where > >> half-steps > >> will lead to user confusion, unmet expectations, and potentially severe > >> security vulnerabilities. > >> > >> I changed the subject line to include [DISCUSS] to hopefully generate > some > >> more interest here for other community members to weigh in. Thanks for > >> getting the conversation started. > >> > >> [1] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/NIFI-2653 > >> [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_security_module > >> [3] https://www.vaultproject.io/ > >> [4] https://square.github.io/keywhiz/ > >> [5] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/NIFI-1831 > >> [6] > >> https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/NIFI/ > Security+Feature+Roadmap > >> [7] https://cwiki.apache.org/confluence/display/NIFI/Variable+Registry > >> > >> Andy LoPresto > >> [email protected] > >> [email protected] > >> PGP Fingerprint: 70EC B3E5 98A6 5A3F D3C4 BACE 3C6E F65B 2F7D EF69 > >> > >> On Apr 25, 2018, at 12:24 PM, Sivaprasanna <[email protected]> > >> wrote: > >> > >> Hi > >> > >> Since flowfile attributes and VariableRegistry is not suitable (not > safe, > >> to be specific), developers have to rely on manually configuring the > >> sensitive values on the components (Processors & ControllerServices). > And > >> during CI/CD (using flow registry), the sensitive information are > dropped > >> and once imported to the next environment (QA or Prod), the user is > >> expected to configure the sensitive information again, although for the > >> first time. How about we introduce sort of a 'vault' that holds > sensitive > >> values which could possibly avoid this unnecessary step completely ? > >> > >> - > >> Sivaprasanna > >> > >> >
