Maybe ask LinkedIn, Zappos, Evernote, Living Social or Adobe if it's prudent to assume that no one will ever get hold of your password hashes. One researcher was able to recover 80% (~140 million) of passwords from the LinkedIn breach in a single day, they were using unsalted SHA1.
Regards Scott On 9 December 2016 at 02:17, Taher Alkhateeb <[email protected]> wrote: > I think the best solution in here is to actually parameterize the > encryption algorithm with a default backwards compatible choice (SHA1). > > However, I'm not sure that we do need that. SHA1 is okay I think, and it > has the most support out there in terms of libraries. Do we have any > history of people cracking passwords in OFBiz _because_ they are SHA1? I > mean for that to happen, I think not only does the password have to be > weak, but the attacker should have access to the database and be able to > retrieve the password hashes, which seems less likely to me. > > On Fri, Dec 9, 2016 at 12:06 PM, Michael Brohl <[email protected]> > wrote: > > > I agree, Hans. > > > > A new implementation should be optional and not simply replace the old. > > > > Regards, > > > > Michael > > > > Am 09.12.16 um 03:12 schrieb Hans Bakker: > > > > What is the impact? > >> > >> if people have to re-enter the password then it is not acceptable. > >> > >> it should be backwards compatible. > >> > >> Regards, > >> Hans > >> > >> On 08/12/16 16:33, Michael Brohl wrote: > >> > >>> Jacques, > >>> > >>> I have no time to think about it more so I would prefer to create a > >>> Jira, provide a patch and wait a few days for people to review. > >>> > >>> I see no need to hurry with this issue. > >>> > >>> Thanks, > >>> > >>> Michael > >>> > >>> > >>> Am 08.12.16 um 10:01 schrieb Jacques Le Roux: > >>> > >>>> OK, nobody expressed a concern so I'll apply a lazy consensus and > >>>> implement "SHA-512 and increase PBKDF2_ITERATIONS to 10 000" > >>>> > >>>> Else please express your concern now before I create a Jira for that > >>>> > >>>> Thanks > >>>> > >>>> Jacques > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Le 05/12/2016 à 16:38, Jacques Le Roux a écrit : > >>>> > >>>>> Thanks Jinghai, indeed Argon does not seems to be implemented in > >>>>> available JDKs, maybe later... > >>>>> > >>>>> Jacques > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Le 05/12/2016 à 15:48, Shi Jinghai a écrit : > >>>>> > >>>>>> Hi Jacques, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Personally I'd prefer PBKDF2 rather than Argon, because the encrypt > >>>>>> of PBKDF2 is done by JDK, I don't know whether Argon has been > >>>>>> supported by JDK. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Kind Regards, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Shi Jinghai > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----邮件原件----- > >>>>>> 发件人: Jacques Le Roux [mailto:[email protected]] > >>>>>> 发送时间: 2016年12月5日 22:24 > >>>>>> 收件人: [email protected] > >>>>>> 抄送: gregory draperi > >>>>>> 主题: Replace password encryption SHA-1 by SHA-512 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Hi, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> At https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/OFBIZ-8537 Junyuan has > >>>>>> contributed a new PBDKF2_SHA* one way encryption for password > >>>>>> > >>>>>> At http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?rev=1772589&view=rev Jinghai has > >>>>>> committed it, I made few remarks on this commit, one of this comment > >>>>>> was also discussed in the Jira by Pierre and Michael. It's about > >>>>>> using PBDKF2 OOTB. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> After reading https://cryptosense.com/parameter-choice-for-pbkdf2/ > I > >>>>>> think we should replace our current SHA1 default implementation by > >>>>>> SHA-512 and increase PBKDF2_ITERATIONS to 10 000 > >>>>>> > >>>>>> We should also provide new PBDKF2_SHA1 password data. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> As suggested by the article above, another step would be to use > >>>>>> Argon https://password-hashing.net/ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> What do you think? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Jacques > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > > > > >
