[
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4533?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16362890#comment-16362890
]
Hudson commented on PHOENIX-4533:
---------------------------------
FAILURE: Integrated in Jenkins build Phoenix-master #1936 (See
[https://builds.apache.org/job/Phoenix-master/1936/])
PHOENIX-4533 Modified Query Server to use two sets of Kerberos (elserj: rev
a71c4b7e3c11f1c7d1955b51929ad65b252feb62)
* (edit)
phoenix-queryserver/src/it/java/org/apache/phoenix/end2end/HttpParamImpersonationQueryServerIT.java
* (edit) phoenix-core/src/main/java/org/apache/phoenix/query/QueryServices.java
* (edit)
phoenix-queryserver/src/main/java/org/apache/phoenix/queryserver/server/QueryServer.java
* (edit)
phoenix-queryserver/src/it/java/org/apache/phoenix/end2end/SecureQueryServerIT.java
> Phoenix Query Server should not use SPNEGO principal to proxy user requests
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: PHOENIX-4533
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/PHOENIX-4533
> Project: Phoenix
> Issue Type: Improvement
> Reporter: Lev Bronshtein
> Assignee: Lev Bronshtein
> Priority: Minor
> Fix For: 5.0.0, 4.14.0
>
> Attachments: PHOENIX-4533.1.patch, PHOENIX-4533.2.patch,
> PHOENIX-4533.3.patch, PHOENIX-4533.squash.patch
>
>
> Currently the HTTP/ principal is used by various components in the HADOOP
> ecosystem to perform SPNEGO authentication. Since there can only be one
> HTTP/ per host, even outside of the Hadoop ecosystem, the keytab containing
> key material for local HTTP/ principal is shared among a few applications.
> With so many applications having access to the HTTP/ credentials, this
> increases the chances of an attack on the proxy user capabilities of Hadoop.
> This JIRA proposes that two different key tabs can be used to
> 1. Authenticate kerberized web requests
> 2. Communicate with the phoenix back end
--
This message was sent by Atlassian JIRA
(v7.6.3#76005)
