Hi everyone!

I've drafted a small proposal here:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1uIJUp1BeAGm_mSO8OBjIZmeL5zY8dLzuYRP4Ah1U7X0/edit?usp=sharing


In summary, this proposes adding a new resetCredentials functionality to
Polaris to allow service_admin to be able to reset any principal's
credentials. This is really useful for a number of different credential
loss scenarios, eg. when someone leaves the company, an employee goes on
temporary leave, forgotten passwords etc. Of course, we hope that users
have no single point of failure for their critical workloads, but these
kinds of issues often don't become apparent until credential loss actually
occurs, at which point remediation can become difficult in Polaris. Having
a root user with the ability to reset credentials is a decently common
concept and I think it would add value. Currently, the only workaround is
to create a new principal and reassign all of their principal roles.

However, addressing the risks is also important. This proposal introduces a
path for service_admins to basically be able to assume any principal within
Polaris, which is a major security vulnerability if a principal with
service_admin access ever did become compromised. However, this risk is
already present because a service_admin can create principals and assign
principal roles to assume the same level of privileges desired, it just
can't actually impersonate as any other principal.

It looks like there is existing appetite to add something like this to
Polaris: https://github.com/apache/polaris/issues/624

I'm curious to hear what the community thinks we can do to address this and
whether introducing these risks is worth having functionality like this.

Thanks for reading,
Sehaj

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