+1 Thanks for adding the opaque access tokens support, JB! I will take a
look at PR.

Yufei


On Mon, Nov 9, 2026 at 9:44 AM Alex Dutra via dev <[email protected]>
wrote:

> Hi JB,
>
> Thanks for opening the PR, I already approved.
>
> Q1: to me, it's actually ClaimsLocator that is being "abused" a
> little, since it was designed to walk JWT claims, but now it's walking
> arbitrary tree-like objects. I think it would be slightly cleaner if
> ClaimsLocator was given the object to walk, as opposed to be given a
> SecurityIdentity and letting it decide which object should be walked.
> But we can improve that as a follow-up, if others agree with me.
>
> Q2: that's the expected trade-off with opaque tokens. I'm OK with that.
>
> Thanks,
> Alex
>
> On Mon, Nov 9, 2026 at 5:30 PM Dmitri Bourlatchkov via dev
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> >
> > Hi JB,
> >
> > Thanks for the PR!
> >
> > IMHO, it is a valuable enhancement to OIDC flows in Polaris in general,
> but
> > it is always good to see adoption from real users too.
> >
> > Q1: I tend to think that is is fine to call PrincipalMapper for opaque
> > tokens. I even suggested in GH to delegate the whole token type check to
> > the specific PrincipalMapper impl., unless we want earlier type checks
> for
> > optimization reasons.
> >
> > Q2: I agree that this is a valid trade-off. It is nice to see that
> Quarkus
> > supports it via its built-in tools.
> >
> > AFAIK, the introspection calls will actually happen only if the token is
> > opaque to begin with. I do not think this change affects the processing
> of
> > JWT tokens in any way.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Dmitri.
> >
> > On Mon, Nov 9, 2026 at 10:49 AM Jean-Baptiste Onofré <[email protected]>
> > wrote:
> >
> > > Hi everyone,
> > >
> > > Last week I chatted with a Polaris user (a bank in France) that has an
> > > issue with IdP support.
> > > His IdP (per policy) only issues opaque access tokens.
> > >
> > > So, I would like to start a discussion about support opaque (non JWT)
> > > access tokens when Polaris is configured with external authentication
> > > (polaris.authentication.type=external).
> > >
> > > Today, Polaris only works with IdP issuing JWT access tokens. Quarkus
> OIDC
> > > already validates opaque tokens through the token introspection
> endpoint of
> > > the identity provider (RFC 7662), but Polaris drops the resulting
> identity:
> > > OidcIdentityPreparer only handles identities whose principal is a
> > > JsonWebToken, so no PolarisCredential is created and the request is
> > > rejected with 401. Note that our documentation suggests providing a
> > > custom PrincipalMapper for opaque tokens, but that can't work, as no
> mapper
> > > is invoked for these identities.
> > >
> > > I opened a PR to address this:
> https://github.com/apache/polaris/pull/6026
> > >
> > > The change is small and doesn't modify any public interface:
> > > - OidcIdentityPreparer also prepares identities carrying a token
> > > introspection response.
> > > - The default principal mapper resolves the existing
> > > polaris.oidc.principal-mapper.*-claim-path settings against the JWT
> claims,
> > > or against the introspection response for opaque token (for instance
> > > "username" or "sub"). The JWT takes precedence, so the behavior is not
> > > changed for JWT tokens.
> > > - Roles come from the introspection "scope" field and go through the
> > > existing polaris.oid.principal-roles-mapper.* settings.
> > >
> > > I would like your feedback on a couple of points:
> > > 1. Custom PrincipalMapper/PrincipalRolesMapper impl will now also be
> > > invoked for opaque token identities, whose principal is not a
> JsonWebToken.
> > > Before, such requests were rejected before reaching any mapper.
> > > Implementations blindly casting the principal to JsonWebToken will
> have to
> > > handle this case. I added an upgrade note in the CHANGELOG about that.
> Do
> > > you see any concern with this?
> > > 2. With opaque tokens, every request triggers a call to the
> introspection
> > > endpoint unless the Quarkus token cache is enabled
> > > (quarkus.oidc.token-cache.max-size, disabled by default). I documented
> the
> > > trade-off (load on the identity provider vs revoked tokens being
> accepted
> > > until the cache entry expires) rather than changing the default. Does
> it
> > > sound good to you?
> > >
> > > Thoughts?
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > >
> > > Regards
> > > JB
> > >
>

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