Yes that's correct.

Sun chose to use the ClassLoader to represent the service's pincipal, dynamically granting permission after proxy verification.

So that's what we have available on the call stack to use when performing authorisation permission checks:

  1. Client's Principal. (Principal based grant)
  2. ClassLoader (ClassLoader based grant, usually dynamically)
  3. CodeSource's of other modules (CodeSource based grants).

Since we trust the code with Maven (because it's downloaded and verified separately), it's probably not appropriate to use a ClassLoader to represent the service's principal in the client.

I guess it really depends on the information that needs protection at the client and how much risk there is of information leaking to a service from the client, and the consequences. I suspect that for a lot of applications where the users belong to one organisation, there probably nothing to be done.

It may be as simple as using a DomainCombiner to add a ProtectionDomain representing the service's principal (Subject) to the stack, or it may not be necessary to do anything at all. Currently Java only relaxes permission when injecting all ProtectionDomain's on a Thread's call stack with Principals (representing a user Subject), it's effectively granting the permissions of the user to all ProtectionDomain's on the stack. Typically in the current scenario, code, although trusted, is granted less permission in order to allow a user to be granted permission.

An alternative behaviour would be to append a protection domain representing a user (Subject) to an existing call stack, such that the resuting permission set is the intersection of all domains (rather than the intersection of all code based grants and the addition of user based grants). In this case code can be granted all the permissions it needs and users might actually reduce the set of permissions, instead of only granting additional permission.

So summing up, I think it's something to be aware of, but depending on circumstances probably doesn't require doing anything.

Smart proxy's might share ClassLoaders; making dynamic permission grants to ClassLoaders based on the service that has just been authenticated (as per current practise), may not be appropriate.

Cheers,

Peter.

On 28/09/2017 2:54 AM, Dennis Reedy wrote:
Hi Peter,

In reading your missive I'm not sure I understand when you say "Maven will
present a new alternative of maximum sharing, where different service
principals will share the same identity.", or "Maven class resolution".

Are you referring to an approach where a service may declare it's codebase
as an artifact that may have transitive dependencies, and that artifact,
when resolved (from perhaps a secure repository) is downloaded onto the
requesting client using Maven's local repository scheme? Then remote code
becomes local code right? If services publish artifacts to (public/trusted)
repositories and follow the approach that published versions are immutable,
then a client would download the code only once, and re-use as necessary.

Or are you thinking of this or something else?

Thanks

Dennis

On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 4:59 AM, Peter<j...@zeus.net.au>  wrote:

Some updates on thoughts about OSGi:

   1. In JGDMS, SafeServiceRegistrar (extends ServiceRegistrar),
      ServiceDiscoveryManager and ProxyPreparer allow provisioning of
      OSGi bundles for Jini services.
   2. SafeServiceRegistrar lookup results contain only instances of
      java.lang.reflect.Proxy (implementing ServiceProxyAccessor,
      ServiceCodebaseAccessor, ServiceAttributesAccessor) which a user
      remarshalls and unmarshalls into their OSGi bundle provisioned
      ClassLoader, prior to retrieving the actual service proxy using
      ServiceProxyAccessor.
   3. As a result different service principals using identical proxy
      codebases, needn't share a ClassLoader, addressing the trust
      domain issue previously alluded to.
   4. There's no current mechanism to allow provisioning of a bundle for
      a Registrar.
   5. Existing discovery providers accept ClassLoader arguments for
      unmarshalling Registrar's.
   6. Existing Multicast responses allow for additional information to
      be appended; a codebase resource for example.
   7. LookupLocator, LookupDiscovery and LookupLocatorDiscovery classes
      don't utilise discovery providers ClassLoader arguments.
   8. Need to allow bundles to be provisioned for lookup services after
      multicast discovery, by exposing discovery provider ClassLoader
      arguments and allowing client to manage provisioning of bundle
      into a ClassLoader, then passing that in during unicast discovery.
   9. Don't break backward compatiblity.

Cheers,

Peter.

On 16/11/2016 4:18 PM, Dawid Loubser wrote:

+1 for OSGi providing the best solution to the class resolution problem,
though I think some work will have to be done around trust, as you say.


On 16/11/2016 02:23, Peter wrote:

The conventional alternatives will remain;  the existing ClassLoader
isolation and the complexities surrounding multiple copies of the same or
different versions of the same classes interacting within the same jvm.
Maven will present a new alternative of maximum sharing, where different
service principals will share the same identity.

Clearly, the simplest solution is to avoid code download and only use
reflection proxy's

An inter process call isn't remote, but there is a question of how a
reflection proxy should behave when a subprocess is terminated.

UndeclaredThrowableException seems appropriate.

It would plug in via the existing ClassLoading RMIClassLoader provider
mechanism, it would be a client concern, transparent to the service or
server.

The existing behaviour would remain default.

So there can be multiple class resolution options:

1. Existing PrefferedClassProvider.
2. Maven class resolution, where maximum class sharing exists.  This may
be preferable in situations where there is one domain of trust, eg within
one corporation or company.  Max performance.
3. Process Isolation.  Interoperation between trusted entities, where
code version incompatibilities may exist, because of separate development
teams and administrators.  Each domain of trust has it's own process
domain.  Max compatibility, but slower.
4. OSGi.

There may be occassions where simpler (because developers don't need to
understand ClassLoaders), slow, compatible and reliable wins over fast and
complex or broken.

A subprocess may host numerous proxy's and codebases from one principal
trust domain (even a later version of River could be provisioned using
Maven).  A subprocess would exist for each trust domain. So if there are
two companies, code from each remains isolated and communicates only using
common api.  No unintended code versioning conflicts.

This choice would not prevent or exclude other methods of communication,
the service, even if isolated within it's own process will still
communicate remotely over the network using JERI, JSON etc.  This is
orthogonal to and independant of remote communication protocols.

OSGi would of course be an alternative option, if one wished to execute
incompatible versions of libraries etc within one process, but different
trust domains will have a shared identity, again this may not matter
depending on the use case.

Cheers,

Peter.

ESent from my Samsung device.



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