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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SLING-8879?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16989033#comment-16989033
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Ilguiz Latypov edited comment on SLING-8879 at 12/5/19 5:58 PM:
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I also see a suggestion to fool-proof more characters serialized as JSON
strings in case these strings are embedded into a javascript embedded in HTML
or XHTML.
https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/11091/is-this-json-encoding-vulnerable-to-cdata-injection/11097#11097
This suggests to encode with {{raw \uXXXX}}
* the opening angle bracket {{raw <}} against closing the script tag or
opening a comment tag,
* the closing angle bracket {{raw >}} against closing a possible CDATA
wrapper around the javascript text embedded in XHTML (and HTML?),
* {{U+2028}} and {{U+2029}} allowed in JSON but not in Javascript against
disrupting the javascript engine.
* the ampersand {{raw &}} against the mandatory HTML entity decoding in
XHTML (but not HTML) documents. This decoding applies to text both outside and
inside the script tag.
was (Author: ilatypov):
I also see a suggestion to fool-proof more characters serialized as JSON
strings in case these strings are embedded into a javascript embedded in HTML.
https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/11091/is-this-json-encoding-vulnerable-to-cdata-injection/11097#11097
This suggests to encode with {{raw \uXXXX}}
* the opening angle bracket {{raw <}} against closing the script tag or
opening a comment tag,
* the closing angle bracket {{raw >}} against closing a possible CDATA
wrapper around the javascript text embedded in XHTML (and HTML?),
* {{U+2028}} and {{U+2029}} allowed in JSON but not in Javascript against
disrupting the javascript engine.
* the ampersand {{raw &}} against the mandatory HTML entity decoding in
XHTML (but not HTML) documents. This decoding applies to text both outside and
inside the script tag.
> Make JSONObject#toString and XSSAPI#encodeForJSString both safe and correct
> for pasting into a javascript string literal
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: SLING-8879
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SLING-8879
> Project: Sling
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: XSS Protection API
> Reporter: Ilguiz Latypov
> Priority: Minor
>
> The current implementation risks exceptions in strict javascript engines.
> |return source == null ? null :
> Encode.forJavaScript(source).replace("\\-", "\\u002D");|
> Substitutes on top of the encoder's result with the intent to correct the
> encoder are near-sighted (i.e. suffer from the context-free approach). If
> {{source}} had a backslash followed by a dash, i.e. {{raw \-}}, the
> {{forJavaScript}} call would properly change the backslash into 2 backslashes
> {{raw \\-}} (this would result in the javascript engine
> turning the string literal back to {{raw \-}}). But the subsequent
> {{replace}} call will destroy the context of the second backslash, turning
> the string into {{raw \\u002D}} which would turn to {{raw
> \u002D}} in the javascript engine's variable.
> I argue for dropping the {{.replace()}} call (aiming at disabling malicious
> comment injection) here and encoding the opening angle bracket {{raw <}} as
> {{raw \u003C}} in the {{Encode.forJavaScript}} implementation. This will
> protect against both the malicious comment injection and the injection of
> closing script tags {{raw <\script>}} forcing the javascript
> interpreter to drop out of the string literal context and drop out of the
> script context.
> The existing prefixing of forward slashes with a backslash agrees with JSON
> but not with Javascript. It should be removed in favour of replacing just the
> opening angle bracket.
> {noformat}
> SingleEscapeCharacter :: one of
> ' " \ b f n r t v
> {noformat}
> [https://www.ecma-international.org/ecma-262/6.0/#sec-literals-string-literals]
> [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/String#Escape_notation]
> I noticed that JSONObject#toString suffers from the same idea of a
> non-universal protection of the forward slash. I guess both XSSAPI and
> JSONObject#toString reuse the same code.
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