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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TAPESTRY-2482?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12622659#action_12622659
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Martijn Brinkers commented on TAPESTRY-2482:
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My solution for this can be found at
http://wiki.apache.org/tapestry/Tapestry5PreventClientSideChanges
> Protect serialized object blobs from being tampered by external user
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: TAPESTRY-2482
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TAPESTRY-2482
> Project: Tapestry
> Issue Type: Improvement
> Components: Core Components
> Affects Versions: 5.0.13
> Reporter: Martijn Brinkers
>
> Using ClientPersistentFieldStorage (t:state:client parameter) an external
> user can
> 'inject' arbitary serialiable objects.
> An external user can inject for example a very big byte array consuming a lot
> of memory.
> One solution would be to add a keyed secure hash (HMAC to be precise) to the
> binary blob to Tapestry can detect that the blob has been tampered with. It
> be nice if the packing/unpacking (currently done by Base64ObjectInputStream)
> would be serviced (that is make it a service) so it would be easy to override
> this behaviour.
> Same applies to t:formdata although the impact is less because it only
> accepts objects implementing ComponentAction.
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