According to <https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.11/x86/sgx.html#encryption-engines>:
> In CPUs prior to Ice Lake, the Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) is used to > encrypt pages leaving the CPU caches. MEE uses a n-ary Merkle tree with root > in SRAM to maintain integrity of the encrypted data. This provides integrity > and anti-replay protection but does not scale to large memory sizes because > the time required to update the Merkle tree grows logarithmically in relation > to the memory size. > > CPUs starting from Icelake use Total Memory Encryption (TME) in the place of > MEE. TME-based SGX implementations do not have an integrity Merkle tree, > which means integrity and replay-attacks are not mitigated. B, it includes > additional changes to prevent cipher text from being returned and SW memory > aliases from being Created. Is this accurate? If I understand it correctly, this would compromise the security properties of SGX dramatically, and make it unsuitable for many current applications, wouldn't it? -- You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub: https://github.com/apache/incubator-teaclave-sgx-sdk/issues/333#issuecomment-899608319
