D M Murali Krishna Reddy created TEZ-4354:
---------------------------------------------

             Summary: Update netty to 4.1.61.Final
                 Key: TEZ-4354
                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TEZ-4354
             Project: Apache Tez
          Issue Type: Improvement
            Reporter: D M Murali Krishna Reddy


[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-16869]

Netty before 4.1.42.Final mishandles whitespace before the colon in HTTP 
headers (such as a "Transfer-Encoding : chunked" line), which leads to HTTP 
request smuggling.

 

[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-20444]

HttpObjectDecoder.java in Netty before 4.1.44 allows an HTTP header that lacks 
a colon, which might be interpreted as a separate header with an incorrect 
syntax, or might be interpreted as an "invalid fold."

 

[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-20445]

HttpObjectDecoder.java in Netty before 4.1.44 allows a Content-Length header to 
be accompanied by a second Content-Length header, or by a Transfer-Encoding 
header.

 

[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21290]

Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application 
framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol 
servers & clients. In Netty before version 4.1.59.Final there is a 
vulnerability on Unix-like systems involving an insecure temp file. When 
netty's multipart decoders are used local information disclosure can occur via 
the local system temporary directory if temporary storing uploads on the disk 
is enabled. On unix-like systems, the temporary directory is shared between all 
user. As such, writing to this directory using APIs that do not explicitly set 
the file/directory permissions can lead to information disclosure. Of note, 
this does not impact modern MacOS Operating Systems. The method 
"File.createTempFile" on unix-like systems creates a random file, but, by 
default will create this file with the permissions "-rw-r--r--". Thus, if 
sensitive information is written to this file, other local users can read this 
information. This is the case in netty's "AbstractDiskHttpData" is vulnerable. 
This has been fixed in version 4.1.59.Final. As a workaround, one may specify 
your own "java.io.tmpdir" when you start the JVM or use 
"DefaultHttpDataFactory.setBaseDir(...)" to set the directory to something that 
is only readable by the current user.

 

[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21295]

Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application 
framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol 
servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 
4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a 
Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is 
not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine 
as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes 
in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects 
(`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec 
`and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote 
peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users 
may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If 
the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, 
the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can 
smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. 
For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only 
affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is 
used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 
objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This 
has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the 
validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that 
is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.

 

[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21409]

Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application 
framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol 
servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 
4.1.61.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The 
content-length header is not correctly validated if the request only uses a 
single Http2HeaderFrame with the endStream set to to true. This could lead to 
request smuggling if the request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to 
HTTP/1.1. This is a followup of GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did 
miss to fix this one case. This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final.

 

 

There are a couple of critical vulnerabilities in the current netty version 
which is being used. It is better to upgrade netty from 4.0.52.Final to 
4.1.61.Final 



--
This message was sent by Atlassian Jira
(v8.20.1#820001)

Reply via email to