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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TIKA-2717?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16594002#comment-16594002
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Tim Allison commented on TIKA-2717:
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bq. Recommendation is not to use global default typing with Jackson
Thank you for sharing this CVE with us...would you be able to point out where
we're vulnerable and what we need to fix? Lingo24Translator,
JoshuaNetworkTranslator, YandexTranslator...maybe?
> Sonatype Nexus auditor is reporting that Jackson databind version used by
> Apache Tika is vulnerable
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: TIKA-2717
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TIKA-2717
> Project: Tika
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: core
> Affects Versions: 1.18
> Reporter: Abhijit Rajwade
> Priority: Major
>
> Sonatype Nexus auditor is reporting that Jackson databind version used by
> Apache Tika is vulnerable. Recommendation is not to use global default typing
> with Jackson,
> Refer following for details.
>
> Source Sonatype Data Research
>
> Severity Sonatype CVSS 3.0: 8.5
>
> Weakness Sonatype CWE: [502|https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/502.html]
>
> Explanation
> {{jackson-databind}} is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE). The
> {{createBeanDeserializer()}} function in the {{BeanDeserializerFactory}}
> class allows untrusted Java objects to be deserialized. A remote attacker can
> exploit this by uploading a malicious serialized object that will result in
> RCE if the application attempts to deserialize it.
> Note: This vulnerability exists due to the incomplete fix for CVE-2017-7525,
> CVE-2017-15095, CVE-2017-17485, CVE-2018-5968, and CVE-2018-7489. Evidence of
> this can be found at [https://pivotal.io/security/cve-2017-4995]:
> {quote}Jackson provides a blacklisting approach to protecting against this
> type of attack, but Spring Security should be proactive against blocking
> unknown “deserialization gadgets” when Spring Security enables default typing.
> {quote}
>
> Detection
> The application is vulnerable by using this component, when default typing is
> enabled and passing in untrusted data to be deserialization.
> Note: Spring Security has provided their own fix for this vulnerability
> ([CVE-2017-4995|https://pivotal.io/security/cve-2017-4995]). If this
> component is being used as part of Spring Security, then you are not
> vulnerable if you are running Spring Security 4.2.3.RELEASE or greater for
> 4.x or Spring Security 5.0.0.M2 or greater for 5.x.
>
> Recommendation
> There is no non vulnerable version of this component. We recommend
> investigating alternative components or a potential mitigating control.
> Workaround: Do not use the default typing. Instead you will need to implement
> your own.
> {quote}It is also possible to customize global defaulting, using
> ObjectMapper.setDefaultTyping(…) – you just have to implement your own
> TypeResolverBuilder (which is not very difficult); and by doing so, can
> actually configure all aspects of type information. Builder itself is just a
> short-cut for building actual handlers.
> {quote}
>
> Reference:
> [https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-docs/wiki/JacksonPolymorphicDeserialization]
> Examples of implementing your own typing can be found by looking at [Spring
> Security's
> fix|https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/commit/947d11f433b78294942cb5ea56e8aa5c3a0ca439]
> or [this Stack Overflow
> article|https://stackoverflow.com/questions/12353774/how-to-customize-jackson-type-information-mechanism].
>
> Categories
> Data
> Root Cause
> tika-app-1.18.jar *<=* SubTypeValidator.class : [2.9.5, )
> Advisories
> Attack:
> [https://adamcaudill.com/2017/10/04/exploiting-jackson-rce-cv...|https://adamcaudill.com/2017/10/04/exploiting-jackson-rce-cve-2017-7525/]
> Evidence: [https://pivotal.io/security/cve-2017-4995]
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