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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TINKERPOP-3281?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=18101889#comment-18101889
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ASF GitHub Bot commented on TINKERPOP-3281:
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GumpacG opened a new pull request, #3610:
URL: https://github.com/apache/tinkerpop/pull/3610
GraphBinary sized heap allocations from an unvalidated 4-byte length prefix
before reading the payload, so a tiny
pre-auth frame (~6-21 bytes) could demand gigabytes and OOM Gremlin Server
or a connecting driver.
## What changed
- Validate each length/count against the bytes actually remaining before it
sizes an allocation or bounds a loop;
reject negative or oversized with `IOException`.
- Cap eager pre-sizing of growable collections/maps (grow on demand instead).
- Reject truncated length prefixes and negative `BulkSet` bulk values.
- Covers `String`, `ByteBuffer`, `BigInteger`, `InetAddress`, list, set,
map, `Tree`, `BulkSet`, `Bytecode`, `P`
and graph. Well-formed messages are unaffected.
## Testing
`GraphBinaryLengthPrefixTest` (rejection + large round-trip cases); full
GraphBinary compatibility suite green.
<br>
See: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TINKERPOP-3281
Assisted-by: Kiro: Claude Opus 4.8
> GraphBinary deserializer unbounded pre-allocation from length prefixes
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: TINKERPOP-3281
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/TINKERPOP-3281
> Project: TinkerPop
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: io
> Affects Versions: 4.0.0, 3.7.7, 3.8.2
> Reporter: Guian Gumpac
> Priority: Major
>
> GraphBinary value types size a heap allocation (or bound a read loop) from a
> 4-byte length/count prefix before the payload is read or checked against the
> bytes actually remaining. Because GraphBinary is deserialized
> pre-authentication on the default wire path, a tiny malformed frame (~6-21
> bytes) can declare a multi-hundred-megabyte to multi-gigabyte allocation and
> drive Gremlin Server to OutOfMemoryError. maxContentLength bounds the frame,
> not a single declared length, and the binary decoder catches only
> SerializationException, so the OOM escapes. The surface is symmetric: a
> malicious or on-path server can OOM a connecting driver the same way. The
> same shape recurs across String, Collection (list/set), Map, BigInteger,
> InetAddress, ByteBuffer, Bytecode, P, Tree, graph and BulkSet.
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