coheigea opened a new pull request, #772:
URL: https://github.com/apache/ws-wss4j/pull/772

   SamlAssertionValidator cached the ID of an Assertion with a OneTimeUse
   Condition before validating it against its profile and before verifying
   trust in its signing key. As SAMLTokenProcessor only checks the signature
   against the key the Assertion itself carries, an attacker could send an
   Assertion signed by any key with the ID of a genuine one: it was rejected,
   but its ID had been cached, so the genuine Assertion was then rejected as
   a replay.
   
   Check OneTimeUse last in both engines. The streaming engine already trusts
   the signing key before the validator runs, so there this only moves the
   check after the profile validation. Document the remaining case, an
   unsigned Assertion, in the threat model.


-- 
This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service.
To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the
URL above to go to the specific comment.

To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected]

For queries about this service, please contact Infrastructure at:
[email protected]


---------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected]
For additional commands, e-mail: [email protected]

Reply via email to