Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Serge E. Hallyn ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): >> >From 945fe66259cd0cfdc2fe846287b7821e329a558c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED](none)> >> Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2007 08:30:30 -0700 >> Subject: [PATCH] namespaces: introduce sys_hijack (v4) >> >> Move most of do_fork() into a new do_fork_task() which acts on >> a new argument, task, rather than on current. do_fork() becomes >> a call to do_fork_task(current, ...). >> >> Introduce sys_hijack (for x86 only so far). It is like clone, but >> in place of a stack pointer (which is assumed null) it accepts a >> pid. The process identified by that pid is the one which is >> actually cloned. Some state - include the file table, the signals >> and sighand (and hence tty), and the ->parent are taken from the >> calling process. >> >> The effect is a sort of namespace enter. The following program >> uses sys_hijack to 'enter' all namespaces of the specified pid. >> For instance in one terminal, do >> >> mount -t cgroup -ons /cgroup >> hostname >> qemu >> ns_exec -u /bin/sh >> hostname serge >> echo $$ >> 1073 >> cat /proc/$$/cgroup >> ns:/node_1073 >> >> In another terminal then do >> >> hostname >> qemu >> cat /proc/$$/cgroup >> ns:/ >> hijack 1073 >> hostname >> serge >> cat /proc/$$/cgroup >> ns:/node_1073 >> >> sys_hijack is arch-dependent and is only implemented for i386 so far. >> >> Changelog: >> Aug 23: send a stop signal to the hijacked process >> (like ptrace does). >> Oct 09: Update for 2.6.23-rc8-mm2 (mainly pidns) >> Don't take task_lock under rcu_read_lock >> Send hijacked process to cgroup_fork() as >> the first argument. >> Removed some unneeded task_locks. > > Thanks to Cedric for finding an oops when using pid namespaces. The > following patch fixes the problem.
it works fine now. Thanks ! C. _______________________________________________ Containers mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] https://lists.linux-foundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list [email protected] https://openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
