The commit is pushed to "branch-rh7-3.10.0-693.21.1.vz7.47.x-ovz" and will 
appear at https://src.openvz.org/scm/ovz/vzkernel.git
after rh7-3.10.0-693.21.1.vz7.47.5
------>
commit 0bbe620d3d91f005630fab92e493824c6d8c0c37
Author: Liran Alon <[email protected]>
Date:   Tue May 8 12:26:25 2018 +0300

    ms/KVM: x86: SVM: Intercept #GP to support access to VMware backdoor ports
    
    If KVM enable_vmware_backdoor module parameter is set,
    the commit change VMX to now intercept #GP instead of being directly
    deliviered from CPU to guest.
    
    It is done to support access to VMware Backdoor I/O ports
    even if TSS I/O permission denies it.
    In that case:
    1. A #GP will be raised and intercepted.
    2. #GP intercept handler will simulate I/O port access instruction.
    3. I/O port access instruction simulation will allow access to VMware
    backdoor ports specifically even if TSS I/O permission bitmap denies it.
    
    Note that the above change introduce slight performance hit as now #GPs
    are now not deliviered directly from CPU to guest but instead
    cause #VMExit and instruction emulation.
    However, this behavior is introduced only when enable_vmware_backdoor
    KVM module parameter is set.
    
    Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <[email protected]>
    Reviewed-by: Nikita Leshenko <[email protected]>
    Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
    Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
    Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
    
    (cherry picked from commit 9718420e9fd462ac6b7ea840f9e63eb6af7e1bda)
    Signed-off-by: Jan Dakinevich <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 09370ccc455d..d5f8aca82ce0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1090,6 +1090,14 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
        set_exception_intercept(svm, MC_VECTOR);
        set_exception_intercept(svm, AC_VECTOR);
        set_exception_intercept(svm, DB_VECTOR);
+       /*
+        * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
+        * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
+        * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
+        * as VMware does.
+        */
+       if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
+               set_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
 
        set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INTR);
        set_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_NMI);
@@ -1999,6 +2007,23 @@ static int nm_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
        return 1;
 }
 
+static int gp_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+{
+       struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+       u32 error_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
+       int er;
+
+       WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
+
+       er = emulate_instruction(vcpu,
+               EMULTYPE_VMWARE | EMULTYPE_NO_UD_ON_FAIL);
+       if (er == EMULATE_USER_EXIT)
+               return 0;
+       else if (er != EMULATE_DONE)
+               kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
+       return 1;
+}
+
 static bool is_erratum_383(void)
 {
        int err, i;
@@ -3835,6 +3860,7 @@ static int (*const svm_exit_handlers[])(struct vcpu_svm 
*svm) = {
        [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + NM_VECTOR]        = nm_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + MC_VECTOR]        = mc_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + AC_VECTOR]        = ac_interception,
+       [SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + GP_VECTOR]        = gp_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_INTR]                         = intr_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_NMI]                          = nmi_interception,
        [SVM_EXIT_SMI]                          = nop_on_interception,
_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

Reply via email to