On 30.10.2018 11:55, Kirill Tkhai wrote:
> Currently we have several BUG_ON() ported from userspace,
> and they may fire in case of it's used malicious daemon
> instead of original vstorage-mount. So, just prohibit
> mounting with kio from inside container.
>
> https://pmc.acronis.com/browse/VSTOR-16325
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktk...@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Butsykin <pbutsy...@virtuozzo.com>
> ---
> fs/fuse/inode.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/fuse/inode.c b/fs/fuse/inode.c
> index 0695b79c4c50..34e52262d37e 100644
> --- a/fs/fuse/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/fuse/inode.c
> @@ -709,6 +709,8 @@ static int parse_fuse_opt(char *opt, struct
> fuse_mount_data *d, int is_bdev)
> break;
> case OPT_KIO_NAME: {
> char *name;
> + if (!ve_is_super(get_exec_env()))
> + return 0;
> name = match_strdup(&args[0]);
> if (!name)
> return 0;
>
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