On 30 Aug 2016, at 8:38 , Alex Elsayed <[email protected]> wrote: > > As a result, I think it'd be _very_ prudent to continue looking at purely- > software, paravirtualized hypervisor implementations, especially for high- > assurance systems.
I think it’s an illusion to think one can partition hardware into trusted and untrusted bits. In the end, the OS is at the mercy of the hardware, if it’s faulty then you lose, there’s no way around it. You may *think* that the manufacturers don’t make changes to the more conventional bits of the hardware, and thus they are “correct", but that isn’t true, of course. And on top of that we know that there are intentional backdoors in commercial hardware. The only way around this is high-assurance hardware, and this doesn’t come at an affordable cost. Gernot _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list [email protected] https://sel4.systems/lists/listinfo/devel
