On 14 Jun 2017, at 13:54, Jonathan C Day 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

Dear all,

The first of these terms has an... interesting history. In a nutshell, it's not 
always used appropriately. Clearly that's not going to be the case with SEL4, 
but what exactly is meant?

I use the term “trustworthiness” as defined by Verissimo et al, 
Intrusion-tolerant architectures: Concepts and design, 2003 
(https://repositorio.ul.pt/bitstream/10451/14253/1/03-5.pdf):

“Trustworthiness: the measure in which a component, subsystem or system, meets 
a set of properties (functional and/or non-functional).”


Mixed critical is another term that I'm cautious over. It's not completely 
clear to me if the mixing refers to relaxed constraints for utilisation reasons 
or something else.

Mixed-criticality is a well-established term, see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mixed_criticality. In a nutshell, criticality 
refers to the severity of failure, an MCS is a system where functions of 
different criticality are co-located and potentially interact, with a 
requirement that the correct operation of a highly-critical function must not 
depend on any assumptions on the behaviour of less-critical functions.

This is precisely what we mean with MCS support.

(Correct me if I'm mistaken, but I don't think SEL4 implements FLASK, which 
would be the obvious way to provide differing constraints, relaxed constraints 
within the trusted computing model. It's totally the wrong level.)

I assume you’re referring to FLASK = Flux Advanced Security Kernel, a model 
which was originally implemented in the Flux microkernel and later in SELinux. 
That is a particular security policy framework that is much higher-level than 
seL4 primitives, but you can certainly implement it on top of seL4.

But note that neither the original FLASK, nor SELinux, is *trustworthy* in the 
above sense, as they are large, unverified code bases that you can safely 
assume to contain plenty of bugs.

I have absolutely no doubt SEL4 will retain all the provable integrity ever 
claimed (by anyone involved), but this experimental-proto-main branch confuses 
me on what fundamentally changes.

I don’t think I understand. We made no claim that the MCS branch is 
“trustworthy”, in fact, the announcement explicitly pointed out that it may 
contain bugs. But I did indicate that it is undergoing verification, which will 
establish its trustworthiness. Until then, our trustworthy kernel is the 
verified mainline seL4.

The MCS claim I certainly stand by.

Gernot
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