- If somebody has access to the physical connection between you and
Freenet, they can both evesdrop and effect your traffic. Even if they
cannot change the data, they can still most probably get a good idea of
what you are doing.
- The addresses of nodes propogate around the network, so if you run a
node, people will find out.
- Somebody always finds out what you are looking for - and they can make
a pretty good guess whether you initiated the request or not.
- Somebody who siezes your computer and really want can probably figure
out what you requested from Freenet.
- If you use Fproxy you cannot be sure that anonymity filter works.
(I'm sure there is more.)
On Thu, Apr 26, 2001 at 11:53:09AM -0400, Gianni Johansson wrote:
> I have gotten several emails from people who want to post info into Freenet
> targeting China in the last couple of weeks.
>
> I am happy to see new sites in Freenet, but I am afraid that end users may
> get in trouble because they overestimate the anonymity that the current
> system affords. I have been informed that merely running software that uses
> cryptography without furnishing back door keys to the government is a crime in
> China.
>
> I know that various approaches for "cloaking" have been discussed on this list
> in the past. My immediate concern is not solving the technical problem, but
> to provide frank information on the limitations of the current system.
>
> To that end could someone update the public web page with an appropriate
> warning.
>
> -- gj
>
> --
> Web page inside Freenet:
> freenet:MSK@SSK@enI8YFo3gj8UVh-Au0HpKMftf6QQAgE/homepage//
>
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--
'DeCSS would be fine. Where is it?'
'Here,' Montag touched his head.
'Ah,' Granger smiled and nodded.
Oskar Sandberg
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