1) The caching only protects against the same piece of data being rerequested along the same path. As I have just explained it is possible to create a few GB of data that's "close enough" to the item that you want to censor. An attacker can just reinsert it again and again, from a few nodes.
2) > If information is inserted on a limited set of nodes > and then subsequently requested a lot from a > separate set of nodes, with repetition, the sets > will close in on one another in the network topology > until they are "neighbors" and only the originally > targeted nodes are suffering from the attack. This may only open the network up to greater attack! A hostile node(s) can close in on the node(s) responsible for that hash-space and get thier IPs. Consider this attack I run a great node that keeps all the information in the target hash-space, so it has a super response time. I SYN flood other nodes in that specialization to make myself the "best node" for the area, because all the other ones suck now. Once nobody is routing to them anymore I'm done; nobody will find the data anyway and I can eventually assume the things are out of cache and go attack something else. Albeit this is a complicated attack, but it seems feasible for someone with a bunch of infected computers ready to do a DNS attack. Tell me if I'm wrong: I have assumed that a node only gets migrated around because of queries and not insertions. __________________________________________________________________ Gesendet von Yahoo! Mail - http://mail.yahoo.de Logos und Klingelt�ne f�rs Handy bei http://sms.yahoo.de _______________________________________________ Devl mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
