> > > His analysis applies to any large-scale p2p network. There are at least > > > two defenses: either create some sort of certification authority (perhaps > > > a supervisory p2p network) or allow/encourage fragmentation of the target > > > network. > > > > Come now, This is not impossible. GNUnet does it. And does it well. I posted a > > way to adapt this to Freenet's architecture a while back. It can be done. It > > just requires a big code over hall. > > You might be disagreeing with the conclusions of the paper on Sybil. If > so, have you read the paper? If so, which conclusion are you disagreeing > with?
I am disagreeing with the paper. Not in it's conclusions but in it's premises. > Or you might be saying that Freenet could create a CA. If so, can you be > more specific? Not create a CA, but act as one. They state that a CA is necessary to prevent cancer nodes from making multiple identity's to insure privacy and prevent a group of nodes from attacking the network. I'll think you'll agree with me when I say that in terms of data storage Freenet does an excellent job insuring security despite not trusting the node with the data. If they think they could brute force a CHK I welcome them to try. In terms of responsibility for storing data, nobody is responsible in Freenet. They could pretend to be 100000 nodes and then collect lots of data and delete it and nobody would care. The only way they got the data was to cache it in the first place. > Or you might be saying that Freenet could allow or encourage network > fragmentation. Are you? No I am not. There are still two other arias where cancer nodes can be a problem. First is flooding. This is what the GNUnet model solves. Here's the short version: If you give each node credit proportional to the amount of time they saved you by processing a request through them as opposed to someone else, and then allow them to use that credit towards your spending time processing their requests, then you don't need any outside authority. Both nodes know they are not being cheated. If they are then they don't process the requests. Simple as that. Now how does one build up credit in the first place? Simple. If CPU, network bandwidth or hardDrive space are not being used at any particular time, they go to waste. So even if a node has 0 credit you'll still process their request if you have idle resources. Thus you gain credit with them. This way no node can do more damage than The Amount of Benefit they have previously provided to the network + the slack resources in the network + the CPU required to check and then drop N requests. That's as good as it gets anywhere. The only problem this does not solve is if a node does a good job of processing requests over all, but always drops a single key. Freenet cannot truly solve this problem, because there is no way to know that they really should have had the data. BUT a central authority cannot solve this problem ether! The only way to do so would be for it to know where all the data on the network was stored. AND have all the requests routed and returned through it. Otherwise a node could claim it did not receive the data when it did. I don't think I need to explain why this is not a viable solution. _______________________________________________ Devl mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
