Hi, Am I correct in assuming that this model is fairly much independent of the routing algorithm used, or am I missing the point completely? I understand that with your proposal a node needs to have sufficient trust to be able to route but I am not clear how you decide to route to a node.
Ed On November 30, 2003 10:29 am, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Nodes A,B,C,D all have 15 ecounds of trust in each other. > A wants some data. > Routs it to B with TTL of 10. > B docks A 14.14 trust. > 1 secound passes. > B routes to C with a TTL of 9. > C docks B 12.73 trust. > 1 secound passes. > C routes to D with TTL of 8. > D docks C 11.31 trust. > 1 secound passes. > D returns the data. > D adds .04428 Trust back into C's account. > C passes the data allong to B. > C adds .158117 Trust back into B's account. > B passes the data allong to A. > B adds .3218 trust back into A's account. > A adds 13.82 Trust into B's account. > > A gets the Data in 3 secounds when it asked for 10. > > *The Formula for Trust is (2*TTL^2-ReturnTime^2)^.5 > *Every node In the chain has a net Trust gain. > *The Requeter has to pay for it's request. > *No node gives out more trust than it receives. > *Nodes are greedy and accept querrys on the baisis of personal profit. > *The faster a node can fetch data above the rest of the nodes on the > network the more it profits. *Returning Data from your store is very > profitable. > *The more Greedy the network becomes the faster it routes. > *All data will be fetched in 1.414 * TTL time or fail. > *Nobody can launch a DOS attack. > *If a node rejects your request it indicates that it cannot fetch that key > in that TTL profitable. So you learn about specilization even if you don't > get the data. *You keep retrying nodes to see if anyone will take the > request untel it would not be profitable to you even if they returned in > TTL time. Then you reject. *A request for data that is not in the network > uses the maximum ammount of resources, and costs the requester the maximum > ammount. *No intermediate node can be cheated, unless they drop data, or > dirmaticaly slow it down on the return path. > > Please read my proposial for more details. It still need review. Also think > of ways of injecting trust in the first place. I have 2 but more couldn't > hurt. > > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > LOL, yeah. This is exactly what you and Toad were talking about, plus > > > lots of other goodies thrown in. I was so busy writing this that I > > > wasn't reading my email, now as I look back through, I see the two of > > > you were descussing many of the issues that I struggled to sort out > > > to write this. It was realy a let down to see that this wasn't going > > > to be totaly unexpected. > > > > > > Anywho, It ammounts to killing querys baised on time, not HTL. It > > > makes Freenet a positive trust baised network, (read the archives) I > > > bleeve I responded to you a few times talking about some of the > > > implications of this. It eliminates pDNF entirely, which I had come > > > to the conclusion was causing NGrouting to fail. It eliminates > > > vunerability to Black Hole nodes, which I did not know existed, when > > > I wrote this. It impliments proportional querry rejecting. (see the > > > archives where I post sample data talking about a split lifo/fifo > > > system.) It also enables QRing baised on key, etc. > > > > > > Toad: Please give this a very thourough look over. But I think this > > > should be a general solution to most network problems / flooding > > > attacks. > > > > It would still help if you could give an illustration of how your system > > works. > > > > -Martin > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Devl mailing list > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl > > _______________________________________________ > Devl mailing list > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl _______________________________________________ Devl mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
