On Sun, 2003-11-30 at 15:40, Thomas Leske wrote: > Martin Stone Davis wrote: > > Okay, so the attacker could censor the current edition. But he wouldn't > > be able to censor all of them, since they are distributed throughout the > > keyspace. The reader could then just click to retrieve one of the > > previous day's (or week's) editions. The fred interface might be > > designed to make this even easier, if that becomes a problem. > > Well! If there really is not a problem, with making the specialization of nodes > public, then we should make use of that fact in our routing algorithm. >
I went and read about SSK's and redirects and metadata. It seems that the whole structure of Freenet above the CHK level (i.e. the fproxy interface and the whole browsing experience) absolutely requires the ability to route requests for keys which are "well known." Otherwise, there must be some out-of-band distribution system for revised keys. Frankly, I think that it will be necessary to find such a system to achieve the anonymity and censorship resistance goals of Freenet, but the present implementation needs fixed keys. -- Ed Huff
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