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>
> This wouldn't work because an update message would neither contain the
> addresses of the nodes that it has passed through nor send messages back to
> the sender of the update. The only way that this could be used for attacking
> Freenet would be if the attacker had a *very large* surveillance network,
> with large numbers of points at which Internet traffic could be monitored. In
> this case, an attacker could track the movement of an update message because
> of its UniqueID.
You're forgetting traffic analysis. The attacker wouldn't be able to get
*anything* from the message... Its encrypted. You're right about
that. But assuming the attacker has the resources, he need only monitor
traffic on the machine to see what other machine its connecting to,
possibly on what port. Then it watches that machine, and so on. Yes it
assumes the adversary has such resources. I'm of the (paranoid) opinion
that "the adversary" can do damned near anything he/she wants within the
limits of what we restrict him/her.
Oskar's update solution is nice in that it delays the update from the
propogation of update notification. This makes it harder to prove which
nodes have copies of a document, another important property. If Mallory
inserts a document, then at some later date updates it, monitoring the
communication under Ian's scheme, (assuming he can do so), he can find out
which servers have his document.
Under Oskars, the updates propogate only when requested. Since the
node->node traffic is encrypted, the attacker can't determine from the
message which was requested, and since it didn't occur just after his
update, traffic analysis is useless.
> >
> > Ok, so if the DataRequest won't nescessarily find anything after being
> > forwarded, what use is it to anyone?!
Hopefully that won't happen. But the set of nodes touched by a probing
request to HTL depth is == to HTL. The set of nodes affected by a
spreading update notification is == number of nodes that hold the data
(as you corrected me Ian, thanks).
I do have some concerns as to how often these deep requests would be made,
but I think Oskar mentioned some way to shorten their propogation in
certain cases.
Scott
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