Please can we take this to chat? I will post my response there.
On Wed, Feb 28, 2001 at 06:23:14PM +0100, Oskar Sandberg wrote: > On Wed, Feb 28, 2001 at 02:38:19PM +0000, Theodore Hong wrote: > <> > > I would argue the opposite. I think that our best defense is to try as > > hard as possible to make a blocking mechanism impossible. The presence of > > a blocking mechanism is what triggers the legal obligation to use it. > > Compare Cubby v. Compuserve with Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy -- Compuserve > > gets off because they exercise no control over content. However, Prodigy, > > by attempting to filter some content, was made liable for what it let > > through. > > Yes, but what is design and what is implementation? Freenet node operators > are running a system intentionally designed to make content control > impossible - in a society that legally expects its citizens to spy and > turn in one another (which is exactly what our society have become in this > respect), how will running a network designed so as to not be able to > serve the thought-police be a better excuse then simply running a software > implementation that does not allow it? > > The fact is that, whatever we do, data will still need to be addressed in > some way to be found. Whatever we do, an Authority for Illegal Information > (happiness is a society that has such a thing), could still publish > blacklists of such addresses which people should serve requests for. And, > since if they have to manually tell each node operator which information > is illegal they may be stuck in a no win wack-the-mole situation, they > could very well say that node operators, to show a necessary goodwill > effort, have to update their blacklists in realtime from the Authority for > Illegal Information. At that point anybody who "gets" Freenet will be > screaming that that sort of central control is a gross deviation from the > network's design goals, but why should the thought-police care when those > goals are exactly the opposite of theirs (the freedom of information > versus the suppression of it). > > Listen people: You cannot build a network to allow the free publication of > information in a legal system where the free communication of information > is considered a crime, and expect running that network to be legal. > Period. No amount of maneuvering or loophole searching can better this > situation - either Freenet stops being free, society starts being free, or > Freenet will be outlawed by society. Why do we have to have this > discussion again and again? > > > > <> > -- > 'DeCSS would be fine. Where is it?' > 'Here,' Montag touched his head. > 'Ah,' Granger smiled and nodded. > > Oskar Sandberg > md98-osa at nada.kth.se > > _______________________________________________ > Devl mailing list > Devl at freenetproject.org > http://www.uprizer.com/mailman/listinfo/devl -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 232 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20010228/e24a1d95/attachment.pgp>
