You are rapidly converging on the real thing. Secure access is not necessary for a client, and should never be made a required part of the spec, using the the FNP sessions does not complicate things for normal client developers.
On Tue, Jun 26, 2001 at 07:22:06PM -0700, Ian Clarke wrote: > On Tue, Jun 26, 2001 at 10:22:05PM -0400, Benjamin Coates wrote: > > As long as we have a secure way of negotiating the FCP port and don't rely > > on > > an assumed default port. (it'd be too easy for another local user to > > listen > > on the default port and spoof a FCP password request) > > Hmmm, good point. This suggests that a slightly more robust > challenge-response approach would be preferable, at the risk of > increasing the difficulty of client authorship. With the addition of a > secure hashing algorithm to the client (SHA1 anyone?) this can be > achieved. The protocol is: > > 1) Client connects to FCP port on node > 2) node sends random string to client > 3) client appends random string to plaintext password and hashes result > 4) node does same > 5) client sends hash to node which compares its hash to the one created > by the client, and if they are the same the client is authenticated > > Perhaps there is an easier hashing algorithm (from an implementation > standpoint) that we could use in place of SHA1 which would also be > secure. > > Ian. -- 'DeCSS would be fine. Where is it?' 'Here,' Montag touched his head. 'Ah,' Granger smiled and nodded. Oskar Sandberg oskar at freenetproject.org _______________________________________________ Devl mailing list Devl at freenetproject.org http://lists.freenetproject.org/mailman/listinfo/devl
