Even this doesn't completely solve the problem, since we must assume that an attacker will be able to monitor network traffic, and could easily notice that no corresponding message left the node after our reply arrived (with or without the simulated delay).
Of course, I also don't like the idea that we will artificially be making Freenet slower to respond to requests than it already is. Ian. On Fri, Feb 08, 2002 at 08:58:10AM -0500, Tavin Cole wrote: > I propose that if the node finds the data for a key in its cache, or if > it's the end node in the chain, it ALWAYS waits one hop time (chosen > randomly within the statistically correct range) before sending the > DataReply or InsertReply/DataNotFound. > > -tc -- Ian Clarke ian at freenetproject.org Founder & Coordinator, The Freenet Project http://freenetproject.org/ Chief Technology Officer, Uprizer Inc. http://www.uprizer.com/ -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 232 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20020208/2f46ae6b/attachment.pgp>
