Hi! First things first, I didn't want to sign up my Uni email for mailing lists (it gets enough crap as it is) but I'm the same as kjellrs(at)stud.ntnu.no
>Actually, it needs to have an increasing probability >for really low HTLs to avoid node probing. We >currently have a 30% or so chance of not decrementing >the HTL at 1, which rapidly tails off and is >insignificant when you get to the starter HTLs you >are talking about. The node probing problems sounds like the exact opposite of the insertion problem. However, I couldn't figure out where in the code this was, and it would give me the correct numbers (variance in start + variance in end = total variance?). I did find the standard reduction by (at least, didn't get the 'at least' part) 1 in freenet/node/states/request/Pending.java, but not the formula you're referring to. I guess I'll keep digging. >Also, the HTL of queries is randomized a bit before >they are started in the current codebase - a request >at HTL 25 may end up as HTL 22. If I understand this correctly, that would be the perturbHTL in Node.java. It would appear to be at most ?2, but the biggest problem is still that a maxHTL of 25 is a smoking gun, since no other node would send out a maxHTL of 25. In fact, it could turn requests at 23 and 24 into maxHTL 25, turning them into smoking guns. A little mix and match of this idea and mine could prove useful though and could improve on my solution, but I still need to find that low-end HTL code. >The problem is that sometimes people download large >bunches of files at once, e.g. splitfiles or large >freesites, so the attacker will be able to do >statistical attacks. The solution is something called >premix routing, where we use something resembling >mixmaster so that the first two hops are random, the >first hop knows the originator of the request but not >the key, and the second knows the key but not the >originator. I looked into it and I have one problem in understanding premix routing. In order to encrypt it with the public key of the second node, you must have some way of knowing this key. However, you can not go through the first node, obviously, as that one can simply claim to give you this key, while in reality faking it and decrypt both first and second part itself. Going through any other node means that you are completely dependent on the existance of a route between those two specific hosts, which is close to impossible on Freenet. I suppose that works for Mixmaster and TCP/IP, but I don't see it working very well over the Freenet protocol. Kjella ______________________________________________________ F? den nye Yahoo! Messenger p? http://no.messenger.yahoo.com/ Nye ikoner og bakgrunner, webkamera med superkvalitet og dobbelt s? morsom _______________________________________________ devl mailing list devl at freenetproject.org http://hawk.freenetproject.org:8080/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
