I was re-reading the paper "Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory"[1], and this section caught my attention.
> The most practical solution to the problem of DRAM data retention is > therefore to constantly flip the bits in memory to ensure that a > memory cell never holds a charge long enough for it to be > "remembered". While not practical for general use, it is possible to > do this for small amounts of very sensitive data such as encryption > keys. This is particularly advisable where keys are stored in the > same memory location for long periods of time and control access to > large amounts of information, such as keys used for transparent > encryption of files on disk drives. The bit-flipping also has the > convenient side-effect of keeping the page containing the encryption > keys at the top of the queue maintained by the system's paging > mechanism, greatly reducing the chances of it being paged to disk at > some point. Don't put this any higher than very low priority, but a non-toad could do this easily. I just wanted it in the list archives before I forgot about it. Thelema [1] http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/pubs/secure_del.html
