In 0.7, we have to create new DSA groups, because the message hash is
256 bits instead of 160. We have code to generate DSA groups
(freenet/crypt/DSAGroupGenerator) of a configurable key and hash size
(subject to the simplification that key size is a multiple of hash
size).

We now have the security/performance tradeoff of what key size to
actually use.

Here goes (on my Athlon XP 2800+, a mid-range computer by Freenet
standards):
Keysize/bits Sign/ms Verify/ms Verifies/sec Signs/sec
1024         1.1848  3.4894    286          844
1536         1.9513  5.8842    169          512         
2048         3.0466  9.531     104          328

Which is appropriate? Some issues:
- It is possible to transmit a new-style SSK in just over 1kB. This is
  partly so that we can do streaming over SSKs more conveniently.
- Many nodes will have 128kB+/sec of downlink, and some will have that
  sort of uplink. However, a node downloading much more than you upload
  is strongly discouraged as it blows your anonymity.
- An attacker who sends a stream of garbage data can do a CPU DoS,
  however he will be quickly detected as it will not verify. This should
  result in closing the connection and telling the user of the attack.
- However, because signatures are significantly faster than verifies, an
  attacker could generate a series of *valid* SSKs, and fire them at the
  node. If he could grab a big enough piece of the node's bandwidth he
  might be able to do a CPU DoS. Worse, these would be forwarded across
  the network, since they are valid SSKs.
- When reading SSKs from the datastore, we only need to check the
  datastore hash, not verify the signature. Therefore, if an attacker
  repeats blocks, we do not need to reverify them.
-- 
Matthew J Toseland - toad at amphibian.dyndns.org
Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/
ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so.
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