On Friday 04 January 2008 02:18, Michael Rogers wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > One classic strategy from mixmaster etc is to have a long delay at each step. > > We could do this for the more sensitive requests. The objective would be to > > send on the requests (more likely inserts) in groups big enough to likely > > contain requests from all the nodes in the cell. > > Yup, you could definitely make timing attacks difficult if you're > willing to pay the price in latency. Could be useful for things like Frost.
I was thinking of long-term requests in general - large downloads for example. Do we need to do this on the return journey or only on the outward? > > >> Do you mean every node calculates the trust thresholds from one node's > >> perspective, or each node calculates them from its own perspective? > > > > How about a node can't join the cell unless its credibility with all or most > > other members is over some value? > > Sounds promising - but could that result in some nodes not being allowed > to join any cell? Yes. If you're a leaf node you can't use premix routing. > > Also, a node on one edge of the cell needs to be able to calculate trust > scores from the point of view of a node on the opposite edge, so you > have to spread the topology information twice as far. True. > > Cheers, > Michael -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20080104/d6f7c5fc/attachment.pgp>
