On Jan 31, 2008, at 11:57 AM, Michael Rogers wrote: > (This is a different attacker from the one that wants to occupy a > region of > the key space, BTW - this one's goal is to make you search a large > number > of nonexistent subnets before giving up, and possibly to stop you > discovering real subnets by flooding your routing table.)
I suppose what would be necessary, then is that a node only forward (or.. advertise) network id's from the top-'N'-succeeding networks. That would isolate the flood to the attacker's peers, and concentrate the spread of useful (big) network id's for routing. -- Robert Hailey -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20080131/670ce5aa/attachment.html>
