Matthew Toseland wrote:
> On Monday 24 March 2008 18:06, Michael Rogers wrote:
>   
>> Matthew Toseland wrote:
>>     
> [snip]
>>> all space savings from CHK-based splitfiles. This proposal is feasible 
>>> immediately.
>>>       
>> Two questions:
>> 1) How important is saving space compared to anonymity?
>>     
>
> A very good question.
>   
If this new method of insertion us optional and the existing "by normal 
insertion" method is still available to the user, then you could let the 
network/it's users decide what they need.
>> 2) How much space is actually saved by convergent encryption? 
>>     
>
> As the paper argues, the space savings may not be very large. However there 
> are special benefits for Freenet e.g. a user may be waiting for a specific 
> file, regularly rerequesting it; if another user happens to have it, it would 
> be good if the first user would find it immediately and not have to pick up 
> the announcement from the second user. Similarly, if a user is able to get 
> most of a file, but not the last 20%, he may ask for it to be reinserted; it 
> would be best if the reinsert doesn't result in a completely new key, but 
> reuses the existing blocks. Obviously a few unusual applications would 
> benefit greatly from convergent encryption (e.g. daily system snapshotting).
>
>   
>> To put it  
>> another way, how often are large, identical files independently inserted 
>> by more than one person? I would guess that this is rare, and will 
>> remain rare as long as it's easy for people to find content - nobody 
>> will bother inserting a large file if they know it's already available 
>> on the network.
>>     
>
> Hopefully.
>   
>> But using a random key wouldn't defeat the logging attack, so maybe it's 
>> a moot point.
>>     
>
> No. IMHO making an adaptive search as hard as possible is important.
>   
>> Cheers,
>> Michael
>>
>> * Please don't just say "opennet sucks, use darknet" - everyone is using 
>> opennet and will continue to do so until Freenet reaches critical mass 
>> (if it ever does), so we need to make opennet secure.
>>     
>
> The above attacks are relevant even on darknet, they're just a lot slower and 
> more expensive. But a sufficiently powerful and motivated attacker might use 
> them against a darknet. An adaptive search is much much cheaper in both the 
> case of a large opennet and the case of a small but hard to penetrate 
> darknet. Connecting to everyone is tempting but expensive even in the latter 
> case, think East Germany!
>   


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