Using full disk encryption on a lower level is much simpler, and much more secure.
On Mon, Dec 7, 2009 at 5:45 PM, Ximin Luo <xl269 at cam.ac.uk> wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > Thoughts? > > You should probably respond on the blog itself so the author can read it. > > Regardless though, it would be "nice" to have a "self-destruct" mechanism > like > the author describes - ie. the installer should include an uninstaller that > removes all traces of freenet from the computer, as far as possible. > > Obviously this can't feasibly include browser caches and recent history > etc, > but it could at least reverse everything the installer does (cron jobs, key > imports, windows registry changes, temporary files*, etc). The things that > we > can't remove, we can tell the user about, and they can take the necessary > measures. > > It shouldn't be harder than writing a reverse-version of the installer, > plus > any extra state freenet itself might add to the disk. > > Freenet already provides the user with a way to remove all data downloaded > by > freenet, and tries to hide its existence on the network; there might as > well be > a feature to remove (or hide) its existence on the user's hard disk. > > X > > *some windows installers create temporary files and don't delete them > afterwards > > _______________________________________________ > Devl mailing list > Devl at freenetproject.org > http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20091207/13ab961a/attachment.html>
