On Wednesday, 26 July 2017 at 01:09:50 UTC, Steven Schveighoffer wrote:
On 7/25/17 8:45 PM, Timon Gehr wrote:
On 26.07.2017 02:35, Steven Schveighoffer wrote:
On 7/25/17 5:23 PM, Moritz Maxeiner wrote:
On Tuesday, 25 July 2017 at 20:16:41 UTC, Steven Schveighoffer wrote:
The behavior is defined. It will crash with a segfault.

In C land that behaviour is a platform (hardware/OS/libc) specific implementation detail (it's what you generally expect to happen, but AFAIK it isn't defined in official ISO/IEC C).

In cases where C does not crash when dereferencing null, then D would not crash when dereferencing null. D depends on the hardware doing this (Walter has said so many times), so if C doesn't do it, then D won't. So those systems would have to be treated specially, and you'd have to work out your own home-grown mechanism for memory safety.

What Moritz is saying is that the following implementation of fclose is correct according to the C standard:

int fclose(FILE *stream){
     if(stream == NULL){
         go_wild_and_corrupt_all_the_memory();
     }else{
         actually_close_the_file(stream);
     }
}

I think we can correctly assume no fclose implementations exist that do anything but access data pointed at by stream. Which means a segfault on every platform we support.

What a luck that Solaris/SPARC is not supported as on that platform fclose(NULL) and even close(-1) do not segfault. Had to learn it the hard way when we ported our project from Solaris/SPARC to Linux/x86_64. It was surprizing how often that (wrong) behavior happenned in our code base (100K line of C).


On platforms that may not segfault, you'd be on your own.

In other words, I think we can assume for any C functions that are passed pointers that dereference those pointers, passing null is safely going to segfault.
Dereferencing NULL pointer on Solaris/SPARC segfaults but fclose() does apparently not dereference blindly the passed pointer. I suspect that SUN intentionnally reduced the opportunities to segfault on a lot of system calls and libs. The port to Linux revealed several violations (stale pointer usage, double frees, buffer overflows) that never triggered on Solaris and the project is more than 20 year old.


Likewise, because D depends on hardware flagging of dereferencing null as a segfault, any platforms that *don't* have that for C also won't have it for D. And then @safe doesn't even work in D code either.

As we have good support for different prototypes for different platforms, we could potentially unmark those as @trusted in those cases.




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